POLIS Working Papers - Working paper n. 227
Strategic delegation under the subsidiarity principle
This paper presents a model of centralisation, where the decision to centralise policy making is based on the subsidiarity principle. It shows how and when strategic delegation incentives facilitate the misallocation of public goods. We argue that less subsidiarity is desirable when decentralised governments use the subsidiarity principle to force distorted policies.
JEL Classification numbers
D78, H0, H41.
centralisation; intergovernmental relations; bargaining.
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