A theory of political entrenchment

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Abstract

We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high and that low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We also discuss the case where the left-wing party may have the incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once in power. Finally, we show that, in a more general framework, the entrenchment policies can be implemented also by the right-wing party. The comparative statics analyzes the effects of state capacity, a positive bias of voters for one party and income inequality on the incentives of the incumbent party to pursue entrenchment policies. The importance of our theory for constitutionally legislated term limits is also discussed. The theory sheds light on why left-wing parties or politicians often support liberal immigration policies of unskilled workers, are sometime in favor of free trade with less developed economies and of globalization more generally, or fail to reform plainly “dysfunctional” public educational systems damaging the lower classes.

Keywords: Political entrenchment; constituencies; inequality; inefficient redistribution; checks and balances; political rents; state fiscal capacity.

JEL Classification: D72, P16.

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1 Introduction

There is now a large literature in political economy explaining why governments in a variety of institutional environments relatively often pursue policies reducing the welfare of the society. A common feature of some of these models is that socially efficient policies involve a potential reallocation of political power from one social group, in power in the status quo, to another. Therefore, in absence of commitment, partisan politicians, i.e. representing a particular social constituency, may prefer to implement policies harmful to the society at large in order to prevent an adversary group from gaining power. This type of explanation of why socially harmful policies exist and are relatively pervasive is quite compelling and has a wide scope. Nevertheless, it does not explain (the more intriguing puzzle of) why occasionally incumbent politicians appear to pursue policies that are harmful not only for the society as a whole, but also—and especially—for their own constituency. Examples of policies with this apparently paradoxical feature (discussed in greater detail in the following Section) include the liberal immigration policies supported by left-wing parties in Europe and in the US, and the dysfunctional educational policies implemented by a number of Latin American “ populist” governments. The support of NAFTA by the Clinton Administration in the early 1990’s or the reluctance of many left-wing Latin American governments in the late 1990’s and in the 2000’s to abandon the pro-globalization policies implemented by their right-wing predecessors are also potentially puzzling. These policies are not necessarily inefficient but still damage the economic interests of a relatively significant part of the constituency of the governments implementing them.

Why, and under what conditions, is it the case that once in office politicians implement policies that are not beneficial for the very same people who brought them in power? In this paper, we propose a simple dynamic (two-periods) model addressing this question.

In our framework, individuals have both preferences over an economic issue, which is affected by policy (i.e., income redistribution), and over an exogenous noneconomic or ideological issue, as in the spirit of probabilistic voting models à la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1998). Therefore, each citizen has a specific taste for which party is in power and the distribution of this taste is subject to aggregate shocks, which generates

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1 Examples of such policies include the blocking of technological progress (e.g., Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996) and failing to make cost-effective investments in human capital (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1998), subsidizing declining industries (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1998; Brainard and Verdier, 1997; Coate and Morris, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Other examples include investing in inefficient state institutions with limited capacity to tax or coerce citizens (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010a, 2011; Besley and Persson, 2009), protecting unproductive jobs with high firing costs (Saint-Paul, 1993, 2002), creating inefficient social infrastructures (Coate and Morris, 1995; Robinson and Torvik, 2005), or underpricing the shares of privatized companies (Biais and Perotti, 2002).
uncertainty on the outcome of the electoral competition.

We assume that there are only two income classes, the low-skill (or the poor) and the high-skill (or the rich), and two political parties which compete in majoritarian (i.e., winner-takes-all) elections. Each party cares about the welfare of one of the two social groups as in the spirit of partisan models of political economy (e.g., Alesina, 1988; Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997), but also derives rents from being in power, as in the spirit of the classic Downsian model of political competition. As in models of partisan politics, parties cannot ex-ante commit to implement a policy different from their preferred one once in office. We will call the Left and the Right the party that cares about the welfare of the poor and the rich respectively.

There are two periods and, in each period, the party in office chooses the degree of income redistribution. Moreover, and this is the main innovation of the model, we assume that the second period pre-tax income of the low-skill agents can be set at a level lower than the potential one by the government in office in the first period. This policy has two main features: it is straightforwardly Pareto-inefficient and it increases income inequality by reducing the income of the poor in absolute terms as well as relative to the mean income. Nevertheless, we show that, under some conditions, the left-wing party may find it optimal implementing such a policy that damages the members of its own natural constituency.

The rationale for the adoption of this policy is that by reducing the income of the low-skill individuals, income inequality increases and income redistribution becomes more valuable for the poor, so that they will have a higher incentive to vote for the left-wing party. That is, partisan politicians cannot commit on which redistributive policies will be undertaken once they are in office, and only the Left, given its partisan preferences, promotes income redistribution policies. In other words, if the Right could commit to implement enough redistribution in advance, the damaging policy would not be implemented by the Left, as it would not increase its electoral comparative advantage in the eyes of the poor.

Hence, the Left, if in power in the first period, may find it optimal implementing policies that will make the poor more “dependent” on income redistribution in the future, so that the economic incentives of the poor to vote for this party increase. In our model, there are aggregate preference shocks for the identity of the party in power. Given the distribution of those shocks, the Left is more likely to win the election, the more the poor have a genuine economic benefit from its policies. This benefit is in turn stronger, the poorer the poor relative to the rich. We will refer to a policy with that effect as entrenchment because its implementation allows the party to tie its own natural constituency more to itself.
A number of features of our model are worth emphasizing. First, the existence of an equilibrium with potential entrenchment does not rely on any form of myopia or irrationality on either side of the political arena. In fact, it may be rational for the poor to vote for the Left in the first period even though the policy of entrenchment (which becomes effective in the second period) is correctly anticipated. This is because in the first period the Left, unlike the Right, provides some redistribution of income which might more than compensate the poor for their future income losses generated by the entrenchment policy. Second, our argument generalizes naturally to any policy that increases income inequality regardless of the sign of its impact on the income of each group. We focus on the case where the poor’s pre-tax income is reduced and the rich’s is unchanged because we want our model to be able to shed light on why governments may pursue inefficient policies that harm their own constituencies. Third, even though we present a model where only the left-wing party implements entrenchment policies, we are by no means arguing that entrenchment is a policy exclusive of Left. In fact, we also propose an extension of our baseline model where the entrenchment strategy may be optimal for the Right. Moreover, the concept of political entrenchment is more general and can be applied to different frameworks, such as the provision of other public goods. For example, if we consider the case of national defence and assume that this gives a relatively higher utility to the natural constituency of the right-wing party and that such a party has an advantage in providing it, then it is possible that the Right pursues entrenchment strategies through an unnecessarily aggressive foreign policy.

The comparative static analysis shows that political entrenchment is more likely to occur when the rents appropriated by the party in power are higher, which suggests that we should expect more entrenchment in political systems with relatively limited checks and balances. The effect of a positive bias in favor of the Left, a higher income inequality and a higher level of state capacity have in general an ambiguous effect on entrenchment. However, under some conditions on the distribution of the ideological taste shock or when state capacity is low, we show that a higher level of state capacity increases the incentive of the Left to implement entrenchment strategies. Since a low level of state capacity is characteristic of developing economies, this result also suggests that an autonomous increase in state capacity is particularly

\[2\text{Furthermore, in the second period, the poor’s post-redistribution income may still be higher than if the right were in power, despite a lower pre-redistribution income.}\]

\[3\text{While in our model entrenchment is associated with pro-active policies that reduce the relative position of the Left’s constituency, it may also result in failure to implement policies that improve this relative position.}\]

\[4\text{This could be the case in many Latin American countries whose institutions feature a form of presidential government with limited separation of powers with the legislature and the judiciary (see, for example, Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, and Stokes, 2009).}\]
likely to have harmful consequences for developing countries.

We also show that, under some conditions such as the presence of a limited state fiscal capacity, the left-wing party may have an incentive to ex-ante commit not to pursue entrenchment policies once in power. In fact, entrenchment policies increase the probability of the Left’s winning future elections, but they reduce the welfare of the citizens from having this party in power and, therefore, its probability of winning current elections.

Our theory also provides a rationale for constitutionally prescribed term limits. In fact, term limits may reduce the adoption of entrenchment policies since they lower the value of capturing power in the future for the incumbent leader. This result is important not only in its own right, but also because it helps explaining why many real world constitutions prescribe some form of term limits in spite of the fact that a key prediction of the standard model of political replacement is that term limits are always welfare reducing (e.g., Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997).

This paper is related to the literature on the strategic theory of budget deficits where an incumbent partisan leader may strategically use public debt in order to manipulate the future spending policy or the future allocation of political power (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989; Aghion and Bolton, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). In a similar spirit, Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) demonstrate that incumbent leaders may choose to strategically manipulate some macroeconomic state variables, such as exchange rates or the composition of government spending, in order to increase their future electoral comparative advantage. None of these papers, however, addresses the issue of why partially self-interested governments may deliberately pursue policies harmful for their own natural constituency.

A literature in economics (e.g., Harrington, 1993) and in political science (e.g., Stokes, 2001) has addressed the question of why occasionally elected politicians deviate from their electoral promises, creating a discrepancy between mandates and actual policies. According to these authors, once in office (benevolent) politicians may deviate from their original electoral promises if they believe that such policies do not serve best the interest of their own constituency. Therefore, violations of mandates are actually made in the interest of some po-

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5 This is because in such models, repeated elections are sufficient to provide incentives to politicians in power to refrain from appropriating too much rents. Term limits represent a harmful self-imposed constraint since they force voters to replace politicians even if the latter have behaved well in office. As a result, elections prove to be less valuable as a discipline device in presence of term limits.

6 A prominent example is the introduction and consolidation of a vast array of neoliberal policies in many Latin American countries in the last few decades of the previous century, which stood in contrast to the electoral promises made by successful politicians to their constituency (see Stokes, 2001, for a broad discussion on this point).
itical constituencies, and are not necessarily punished ex-post by rational voters. It is worth emphasizing that our paper asks a rather different question, namely why self-interested politicians hurt their natural constituencies and yet the latter vote (and reappoint) them in office despite anticipating correctly the equilibrium strategy of politicians.

Our notion of political entrenchment, which is the source of persistence of power in our model, has some similarity with the concept of managerial entrenchment in the theory of corporate finance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In this literature, managers may entrenched themselves by making manager-specific investments because this reduces the probability of being replaced by raising the cost of such action for the firm and allows them to earn higher wages. Similarly, in our model, political entrenchment makes it more costly for the lower class to vote for the Right, and therefore allows incumbent leftist politicians or parties to appropriate of higher intertemporal office rents by consolidating their power.

Within the large literature on inefficient policies (briefly cited in Footnote 1), our paper is most closely related to the paper of Besley and Coate (1998), Glaeser and Shleifer (2005), and Padró-i-Miguel (2007). In the first paper, a leader representing the perfect agent of a specific social constituency, the low-skill workers with low-ability, may decide not to implement a cost-efficient policy like investing in education, in order to preserve the power of its own constituency. In fact, this would lead to the emergence of an anti-redistribution majority in the future if the low-skill workers with high-ability, whose skills and income are potentially increased by investment in human capital, were educated. In our paper instead, the left-wing party implements an inefficient policy (which is very similar to not upgrading the skills of the poor) for self-interest motivation and against the preferences of its own constituency. This result highlights the importance of our assumption that political agency is not perfect, in contrast to what is assumed in Besley and Coate’s paper.

Glaeser and Shleifer have offered a model of what they called the “Curley effect,” after the famous longtime Boston mayor James Curley. In the first half of the 20th century, mayor Curley successfully attempted to manipulate strategically the electorate of his city by taxing the rich heavily and redistributing revenues to poor Irish immigrants, which represented his own natural constituency. This not only bought Irish votes but induced many rich to leave the city, further increasing the relative size of the constituency of the incumbent politician and consolidating his power.7 The Curley effect analyzed by Glaeser and Shleifer (2005) is a clear example of political manipulation of the electorate related to the one investigated in

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7It has also been argued that the Curley effect is potentially important to explain the politics (and relative decline, as a result of the migration of rich) of other U.S. cities such as Baltimore and Detroit.
our paper. The main difference with our work is that Curley policies help the incumbent leader to consolidate its power by making its opponents worse-off, whereas with the politics of entrenchment, a politician in office achieves the same political outcome by immiserizing its own constituency (and, nevertheless, citizens may find optimal voting for their own natural leader even when they anticipate the implementation of entrenchment policies).

In Padró-i-Miguel’s paper the leaders of competing ethnic groups, once in power, exploit not only the adversary groups but also in part their own group. This is possible because the members of this group fear that the replacement of the incumbent leader may bring to power the leader of the competing group, who would exploit them even more. However, in Padró-i-Miguel’s paper the leader in office does not deliberately reduce the productivity of its own constituency to consolidate its own future power by manipulating a state variable of the dynamic political game, which is the key novel idea of our paper.

The paper also relates to the dynamic models of income redistribution, such as Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997), Bénabou (2000, 2002) and Hassler et al. (2003), where, unlike in the classic static models of Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), income inequality is an endogenous state variable and voting over fiscal policy is forward-looking. Finally, our paper is closely related to the recent work on the persistence of political power and political institutions (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2010b, 2011); yet, the origin of political persistence in our paper is rather different from any of these works.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence for our theory. Section 3 describes the framework. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5 presents the comparative statics analysis. Section 6 discusses under what conditions the Left may want to limit the possibility of pursuing entrenchment policies in the future, while Section 7 proposes an extension of our framework where also the Right may find it optimal implementing policies of entrenchment. Section 8 discusses the importance of our theory for term limits. Section 9 concludes and the Appendix contains the proofs omitted from the main text.

2 Some Evidence

This Section illustrates briefly some examples of policies that are harmful to the constituency of the government implementing them.

1. Immigration policies in Western Europe and in the US
“After World War I, laws were passed severely limiting immigration. Only a trickle of immigrants has been admitted since then... By keeping labor supply down, immigration policy tends to keep wages high.” Paul Samuelson (quoted in Borjas, 2003, p. 1335).

We next present some evidence on the pattern of immigration laws passed in recent years by the European Union (EU) and in the US through the 20th century consistent with the main prediction of our theory.

Migration and immigrant integration policies in Europe are increasingly determined at the EU level. EU rules now cover the full gamut of “migration policies,” from entry, residence, and economic rights of immigrants to societal integration of immigrants and their descendents; in addition, the European Parliament has significant amendment and veto powers in the adoption of these policies.

On the basis of standard labor demand theory (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993), it is reasonable to expect that, to the extent that immigrants are disproportionately unskilled, and unemployed workers are more likely to be opposed to immigration than more highly skilled workers or capital owners, since they are more likely to be in competition for jobs with immigrants than with higher-skilled workers. Consistently with this expectation, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find robust evidence that in the US less skilled workers prefer anti-immigration policies; Mayda (2006) finds similar results in a cross-section of countries. Therefore, one should also expect that left-wing parties support conservative migration policies, in line with the economic interests of a large share of their voters, who often compete with immigrants for unskilled jobs.

In a recent empirical study, Hix and Noury (2007) address the question of which interests EU politicians promote when making migration policies, by looking at the passage of six pieces of migration related legislation in the fifth directly elected European Parliament (1999–2004). In reporting the results of their empirical analysis Hix and Noury (2007, p. 184) write that, “We find that the strongest determinants of behavior in the European Parliament on migration and related issues are the general left-right ideological positions of the European parliamentari-

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8 The empirical evidence on the effects of immigration of unskilled workers on the labor market outcomes of their native peers is mixed. Some papers (e.g., LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Card, 2001), based on the computation of the spatial correlation between native wages and the extent of the penetration of immigrants in local labor markets, indicate that immigrants have little or no effect on the employment opportunities of competing native workers. Borjas (2003) argues instead that such spatial correlation does not necessarily uncover a causal effect for several reasons; immigrants may not be randomly assigned to labor markets and natives may respond to immigration by moving elsewhere. Borjas provides alternative evidence which is supportive of the standard textbook view summarized by the quotation of Paul Samuelson reported at the beginning of this Section (see also Borjas and Aydemir, 2007, 2011).

9 It is worth emphasizing that, for our theory, it is more important what the unskilled workers believe about the effects of immigration on their wages and welfare rather than its real effects on them.
ans and the transnational European parties. These are stronger predictors of political behavior in the European Parliament on these issues than the economic preferences of the European parliamentarians’ constituents, or the economic interests or political preferences of the EU member states. In other words, left-wing politicians support liberal migration policies, despite the economic interests of many of their voters, who often compete with immigrants for unskilled jobs. Meanwhile, right-wing politicians support restrictive migration policies, despite the economic interests of many of their supporters, who benefit from increasing returns on capital investment which results from greater immigration.”

Given that European parliamentary elections are based on a proportional system, we expect Euro-MPs to face relatively little personal accountability for deviating from their constituents’ preferences;\textsuperscript{10} in such a context rents from being in office are likely to be more influential than the constituents’ well-being. Our model predicts that this is when entrenchment is most likely to arise, and this is in line with the above evidence on the MEP’s voting pattern on migration.\textsuperscript{11}

Some evidence broadly consistent with our main proposition that left-leaning political parties are inclined to support liberal immigration policies potentially harmful to (at least part of) their natural constituency, is also provided by the history of immigration laws in the United States through the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In particular, several examples of legislative reforms clearly document that the Republican Party has been generally in favor of restricting immigration, whereas the Democratic Party has often assumed the opposite stance on this issue.

The immigration policy in the US became more restrictive in the second decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century with Immigration Act of 1924, or Johnson–Reed Act, including the National Origins Act, and Asian Exclusion Act, passed by the 68\textsuperscript{th} Congress.\textsuperscript{12} This new legislation limited the annual number of immigrants who could be admitted from any country to 2\% of the number of people from that country who were already living in the US in 1890, down from the 3\% cap set by the Immigration Restriction Act of 1921, according to the Census of 1890. Congressman Albert Johnson and Senator David Reed, both Republicans, were the two main architects of

\textsuperscript{10}See for example Persson and Tabellini (2000).

\textsuperscript{11}In our model, parties partly internalize the welfare of their constituents. This is because the politicians are (partly) “citizen-candidates” who belong to the same social class as their constituents. In practice, one observes that some politicians on the Left comes from the upper-middle class. In this case, it is not as persons that they internalize their constituents’ welfare. Rather, this component of their utility is best viewed as a metaphor for their individual strategies in a context where they have to maintain a reputation with their voters. Again, given the proportional system and the aloofness of the European Parliament to most voters, we expect such an internalization to be weaker there. While this means that office rents play a bigger role, it may also imply that the politicians’ own personal tastes affect their voting behavior. This latter mechanism is absent from our model however.

\textsuperscript{12}A detailed historical analysis of the US immigration policies can be found, for example, in Zolberg (2008).
the reform, and both the House of Representatives and the Senate had a Republican majority.\textsuperscript{13}

The Immigration Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, fundamentally reshaped the American immigration policy for the remainder of the twentieth century and beyond. It abolished the national origins system, set up in the Immigration Act of 1924 and modified by the Immigration Act of 1952. While seeming to maintain the principle of numerical restriction, it so increased the categories of persons who could enter “without numerical limitation” as to make its putative numerical caps—170,000 annually for the Eastern Hemisphere with a maximum of 20,000 per nation plus 120,000 annually for the Western Hemisphere with no national limitations—virtually meaningless within a few years.

By changing long-held immigration policies, the act resulted in new immigration from non-European nations which changed the ethnic make-up of the US. Immigration doubled between 1965 and 1970, and doubled again between 1970 and 1990. The most dramatic effect was to shift immigration from Europe to Asia and Central and South America.

Although the percentage of high school dropouts among immigrants has fallen somewhat, the gap between natives and the foreign born has grown significantly, with immigrants more than twice as likely as native-born Americans not to have completed high school. This contributes to a growing pool of blue-collar workers competing for a shrinking number of well-paying jobs.

Finally, the One Hundred First United States Congress, in which both chambers had a Democratic majority, passed in 1990 the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the number of legal immigrants allowed into the United States each year. The law also provided for exceptions to the English testing process required for naturalization set forth by the Naturalization Act of 1906. After it became law, the United States would admit 700,000 new immigrants annually, up from 500,000 before the bill’s passage.

\textbf{2. The North American Free Trade Agreement}

Another example where political entrenchment may have played a role is the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the democratic-controlled Congress in 1992 with the support of President Clinton. While free trade has positive aggregate gains, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that the low skilled workers in the US will lose, while the high-skilled workers will gain. Therefore, it is surprising that the agreement was signed by a Democratic administration, which may be expected to give a relatively high political voice

\textsuperscript{13}There were only nine dissenting votes in the Senate and a handful of opponents in the House, the most vigorous of whom was the Brooklyn Democrat Representative Emanuel Celler.
to the lower classes. In fact, the union movement, which we may interpret as representing
the welfare of the incumbent, median, low-skilled workers, and which clearly derives less rents
from Democratic politicians being in office than the politicians themselves, strongly opposed
NAFTA. Our model suggests that one of the possible reasons why the Democratic adminis-
tration went ahead with NAFTA is that, by widening the earnings gap between skilled and
unskilled, it would increase future political support for the redistributive programs that are
traditionally implemented by the Democratic party. While this is arguably not the only reason
(a substantial fraction of Democratic voters are rich and benefit from NAFTA), it may have
nonetheless contributed to the overall outcome.

Some interesting features are worth noting. First, the Republicans supported the agreement
more than the Democrats, and they are the ones who initiated it; in fact, if only democratic
congressmen had voted it, it would not have passed.\textsuperscript{14} Does that contradict our model?
Not necessarily, to the extent that the policy generates aggregate gains, it is possible for the
Republicans to benefit from it too, since the direct economic gains accrue to the upper class,
even though their reelection probability suffers. Second, it may well be that the President
is more prone to entrenchment than representatives. In our model, entrenchment is more
likely to arise, the greater is “state capacity,” i.e. the greater the amount of money that the
government can redistribute. Since the US (as opposed to Europe) is characterized by low
party discipline, each individual congressman is accountable to his or her constituency, and
has little ability to implement a redistributive programme at the congressional district level.
Hence “state capacity” is low for congressmen, while it is larger for the President, implying
that the latter may be more prone to entrenchment than the former.\textsuperscript{15}

3. Educational and other “populist” policies in Latin America

“One result of the Chavista political economy is that, like most-heavy-handed statist models
it contains a mechanism for permanently generating its own demand. The state creates poor
business conditions for many sectors, which yields unemployment or capacity underutilization
or both. The government then uses this outcome as an excuse for taking over.” (Javier Corrales,
2010, p. 44).

\textsuperscript{14} Accounts on the determinants of congressional voting on NAFTA differ. But both Kang and Greene (1999)
and Kahane (1996) find that these determinants obey a conventional logic, in that congressional districts with
a greater proportion of potential losers were more likely to oppose the bill.

\textsuperscript{15} It is interesting to observe that Barack Obama himself initially took a negative stance over NAFTA, linking
it to lost jobs in the United States more than once during the electoral campaign of 2007–2008. However,
one in office, Obama appeared to change his mind rather quickly. In his first foreign trip as President, Obama
announced, in the presence of Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “I want to grow trade and not contract
it” (quoted in Stokes, 2009, p. 26).
In a recent book, Edwards (2010) argues that dysfunctional educational policies characteristic of many Latin American countries have a premier role in explaining both the persistence of underdevelopment and of income inequality in that continent. Edwards (2010, p. 179) writes that, “But without any doubt the most important cause of Latin America’s social ills—including poverty and income inequality—is the historical dreadful state of the region’s educational system. By neglecting education the vast majority of the Latin American countries have failed to upgrade their labor force skills and have lagged behind other nations in the key areas of human capital formation and productivity growth. It is not an exaggeration to say that workers in many Latin American countries are among the least prepared to meet the high skill requirements of the twenty-first century.”

While the quality of the educational systems in most Latin American countries has been historically very low, it is interesting to remark that, according to Edwards (2010, p. 181), the efforts occasionally made to reform and modernize the educational system have been strongly, and successfully, opposed by teachers’ unions and left-of-center political parties, the natural political references of the main potential beneficiary of such reforms.

Examples of failed educational reforms include the effort undertook by the Argentinian minister Juan Llach to improve the quality of the school system and the ability of Argentina to compete more effectively in a global economy. Llach’s program, while ingenious and ambitious, was not ultimately implemented due to the opposition of the powerful teacher’s union, of the Peronist opposition party and especially of President Fernando de la Rúa’s own party, the Union Civica Radical, an old and traditional center-left political party. Not surprisingly, the quality of education in Argentina has gradually deteriorated. While there is a considerable variation across provinces, with the rich areas doing relatively well, the educational system in the poorer regions of the country lays in disarray, performing “no better than the most destitute countries of the world” (Edwards, 2010, p. 182).

Many other educational reforms promoted by left-wing “populist” Latin American leaders and aimed at improving the skills and human capital of the lower classes had a similar dismal outcome. For example, the government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela launched a variety of ambitious projects aimed, in principle, at improving education at various levels. These reforms included a literacy campaign (the Misión Robinson), a program aimed at improving quality and coverage of public education (the Misión Robinson II), a program dealing with high-school students and

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16 See also on this topic the classic contribution of Dornbusch and Edwards (1992), which focuses on the harmful consequences of the “populist” macroeconomic policies widely implemented by Latin American governments.

17 Examples include the educational reforms attempted by Evo Morales in Bolivia, or by Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, aimed at improving the coverage of education at promoting literacy campaigns (see Edwards, 2000, p. 181).

18 These reforms included a literacy campaign (the Misión Robinson), a program aimed at improving quality and coverage of public education (the Misión Robinson II), a program dealing with high-school students and
observers have criticized all such programs as ineffective and fraught with corruption however. Indeed, despite massive investments, illiteracy barely declined during the Chávez presidency.

Other types of policies implemented by Chávez’s government with the (apparent) goal of reorienting state priorities to benefit the poor, have also appeared to harm rather than to improve the social conditions of some segments of the constituency of the leader. For example, Hsieh, Ortega, Miguel, and Rodrigúez (2011) have demonstrated using a large dataset with information on political opinion of voters that many of the original supporters of Chávez experienced a 4% decline in personal income after the referendum. Overall, despite the original promises, after twelve year of Chávez’s presidency the economic performance of the lower classes has stagnated at best, but more likely has even declined. In a recent contribution, Corrales (2010) goes even further and makes the argument (summarized by the quotation reported a few lines above) that Chávez’s policies were inspired by explicit goal of reducing the (pre-tax) income of the lower classes, in order to create more social and political “demand” for his own government and thereby consolidating his future power. Indeed, the high inflation and high unemployment generated by Chávez’s policies which, inter alia, featured or caused a significant reduction in both public and private investment (with consequent major capital flights, especially since 2006) and lead overall to a real de-industrialization process, have been especially harmful for the lower classes.

All of these examples naturally raise the question of why the masses in Latin America have been sometime inclined to support populist parties and leaders. Our theory suggests that they probably had little alternative to the policy choice of populist redistribution appealing for the Left.

Yet, in conclusion, it is interesting to remark that some other leading leftist Latin American parties since the 1980’s and 1990’s have instead refrained to some degree, once in power, to implement some of the kind of perverse economic policies described above. Examples include the Chilean moderate Left (e.g., the Concertación of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet) and the government of Lula da Silva in Brazil. Interestingly, both the Chilean and Brazilian “exceptionalism,” relative to Venezuela and Bolivia for instance, are potentially accounted for by our theory. This is because both countries had developed a set of relatively consolidated political constraints and institutional rules, which arguably reduced sharply the potential po-

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Using official statistics Francisco Rodríguez has argued in an article in Foreign Affairs (March/April 2008) that, “Most health and human development indicators have shown no significant improvement beyond that which is normal in the midst of an oil boom. Indeed, some have deteriorated worryingly, and official estimates indicate that income inequality has increased. The ‘Chávez is good for the poor’ hypothesis is inconsistent with the facts.”

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itical power rents (a crucial potential determinant of entrenchment in our model) relative to cases such as those of Venezuela and Bolivia (see Weyland, 2010, p. 19), whose governments largely captured all power for themselves, facing very little opposition.

3 The Model

We consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of citizens, and by two partially selfish political parties. There are two periods of time, \( t \in \{0, 1\} \), and citizen \( i \) has preferences represented by the following expected utility function

\[
u_i^t = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^1 \beta^t u_i^t,
\]

where \( u_i^t \) is the per period utility function of agent \( i \), \( \mathbb{E}_0 \) is the expected value operator conditional on the information available at date \( t = 0 \), and \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the discount factor. The function \( u_i^t \) is assumed to be linear in private good consumption, equal to post-tax income, in the level of the public good provided \( G_t \), financed through proportional taxation at rate \( \tau \), and in an ideological component \( \xi_i^t \) reflecting specific preferences for which political party is in power (that will be described more precisely below). The instantaneous utility can therefore be written as

\[
u_i^t = (1 - \tau_t) a_i^t + G_t + \xi_i^t,
\]

where \( a_i^t \) denotes the income of agent \( i \) at time \( t \).

We assume that citizens also differ in terms of their productivity and pre-tax income, and that a mass \( \lambda \in (0, 1/2) \) are high-skill or rich with pre-tax income equal to \( a^r \), while the remaining fraction of agents \( 1 - \lambda \) are low-skill or poor with pre-tax income equal to \( a^p(\theta_t) = \theta_t a^p \), where \( 0 < a^p < a^r \).\(^{20}\) To save on space, we also define the function \( a^+(\theta) = a^r \).

The productivity of high-skill agents is assumed to be constant over time, whereas the productivity of the low-skilled is potentially time-varying and depends on an endogenous state variable \( \theta_t \in [\theta^L, 1] \), where \( 0 \leq \theta^L \leq 1 \).\(^{21}\) The initial value of \( \theta_t \), \( \theta_0 > \theta^L \), is exogenously given, while the value of \( \theta_1 \) is chosen by the government in office at period \( t = 0 \) at zero cost, so that potential output is always maximized by setting \( \theta_1 = 1 \), while any \( \theta_1 < 1 \) represents an

\(^{20}\) We are assuming that the poor are more numerous than the rich, which in this simple two-groups model reproduces the skewness of the empirical income distributions usually observed.

\(^{21}\) As it will be clear, the lower bound \( \theta^L \) will not play any special role in our analysis and results are unchanged when \( \theta^L = 0 \). The existence of a lower bound to the income of the poor will allow us to analyze under what conditions the possibility of entrenchment is ex-ante desirable for the left-wing party and when it is not (see on this point the analysis in Section 6).
inefficient policy choice. Also note that lower levels of $\theta_1$ imply a poorer and a more unequal society since only the unskilled workers experience a productivity loss. The aggregate and average income at time $t$ is equal to
\[ \bar{a}(\theta_t) \equiv \lambda a^r + (1 - \lambda) \theta_t a^p, \]
and the government budget constraint reads
\[ G_t \leq \tau_t \bar{a}(\theta_t) \equiv \tau_t [\lambda a^r + (1 - \lambda) \theta_t a^p]. \]

To simplify the analysis, we assume that taxes create no distortions for all $\tau \leq \hat{\tau}$, where $\hat{\tau} \in (0, 1)$ is an exogenous level of “fiscal capacity” of the state, while distortions are prohibitively high for $\tau > \hat{\tau}$.

The political process is based on a simple dynamic version of the standard probabilistic voting model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1998), where the outcome of elections is potentially effected by exogenous ideological shocks.

There are two parties, $J \in \{P, R\}$, where $P$ denotes the Left party and $R$ the Right party. The preferences of party $J$ can be written as
\[ v^J_0 = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{1} \beta^t v^J_t, \]
with
\[ v^P_t = (1 - \tau_t) a^p(\theta_t) + G_t + \delta_t, \]
and
\[ v^R_t = (1 - \tau_t) a^r + G_t + \delta_t, \]
where $\delta_t$ represents the private benefit from being in power. We assume that $\delta_t = \delta > 0$ if the party is in power, and $\delta_t = 0$ if it is not. Expressions (3) and (4) reflect the assumption that political parties are partially benevolent, i.e., they care about the economic utility of one specific social class (the Left party cares of the poor and the Right of the rich), and partially self-interested, as they care about the rents from being in office.\(^{22}\) As in the spirit of the partisan models of politics (e.g., Alesina, 1988), we assume that parties cannot commit to implement a policy different from their own ideal one and that individuals vote sincerely.

\(^{22}\)A possible microfoundation of this assumption is that politicians are citizen-candidates as in the models of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), and therefore care about the policy implemented. However, politicians also care to some extent about being in power per se because this allows them to appropriate some rents from office (either due to political institutions or psychological factors, such as “ego rents”). See Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a discussion of citizen-candidate models.
which is a weakly dominant strategy in a two-parties system (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2001). The identity of the government in office at time $t$ will be denoted by $\rho_t \in \{P, R\}$.

The ideological component $\xi_t^i$ in the per period utility of the citizens (1) can be represented as follows:

$$\xi_t^i = \begin{cases} 
\varepsilon_t^i + \eta_t, & \text{if } \rho_t = P \\
0, & \text{if } \rho_t = R.
\end{cases}$$

(5)

The first term on the right hand side of (5) decomposes the overall ideological bias of citizen $i$ in favor of party $P$ at time $t$, $\xi_t^i$, in two components, $\varepsilon_t^i$ and $\eta_t$, while the bias is normalized to zero when the Right is in power.\(^{23}\)

In particular, we assume that $\varepsilon$ represents an idiosyncratic ideological shock that varies both across agents and across time, and whose realizations are i.i.d. over time for each agent and drawn from a continuous distribution function $F(\varepsilon)$ with smooth (i.e., differentiable with continuity) density $f(\varepsilon) \equiv F'(\varepsilon)$ and zero mean. A positive value of $\varepsilon_t^i$ reflects an idiosyncratic bias of agent $i$ in favor of party $P$, whereas a negative value of $\varepsilon_t^i$ reflects a bias of agent $i$ against it. We assume that the density function $f(\varepsilon)$ has the following properties.

**Assumption 1** $f(x) = f(-x)$.

**Assumption 2** $xf'(x) \leq 0$.

Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the density function of the idiosyncratic ideological shock $\varepsilon$ is symmetric around its mean and hump-shaped.\(^{24}\)

The random variable $\eta_t$ represents an aggregate ideological shock that is equal for all agents at each point in time and it is assumed to be i.i.d. over time. The realizations of $\eta_t$ are drawn from a continuous distribution function $\Phi(\eta)$, with smooth density $\phi(\eta) \equiv \Phi'(\eta)$ and zero mean. A positive value of $\eta_t$ reflects the existence of an aggregate bias in favor of party $P$ at time $t$, whereas a negative value of $\eta_t$ represents an aggregate bias against such party. While the computation of the political equilibrium does not require any distributional restriction on $\Phi(\eta)$, in the comparative static analysis we will assume that $\phi(\eta)$ is hump-shaped and reaches a maximum at $\eta = 0$, but it is not necessarily symmetric.

**Assumption 3** $x\phi'(x) \leq 0$.

\(^{23}\)As standard in probabilistic voting models (see, for example, Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1998), both shocks reflect the preferences of the agent for the non-economic policies potentially implemented by the party in office at time $t$. Note, however, that our model differs from a standard probabilistic voting model since we are not allowing parties to commit to any policy other than their own preferred one.

\(^{24}\)Symmetry guarantees that there is a lower density of voters when their ideological tastes are more extreme, even when comparing a left-leaning voter with a right-leaning one.
In the dynamic political game considered, events take place according to the following timing.

- At the beginning of time $t = 0$, the realization of $\eta_0$ and of $\varepsilon_0^i$ for each $i$ is revealed.
- (First election). Citizens vote for either party $P$ or party $R$ conditionally on $\theta_0$, on $\eta_0$ and on $\varepsilon_0^i$; a government is elected depending on the outcome of the voting process.
- The elected government chooses and implements the policy vector $(\tau_0, G_0, \theta_1)$.
- At the beginning of time $t = 1$, the realization of $\eta_1$ and of $\varepsilon_1^i$ for each $i$ is revealed.
- (Second election). Citizens vote for either party $P$ or party $R$ conditionally on $\theta_1$, on $\eta_1$ and on $\varepsilon_1^i$; a government is elected depending on the outcome of the voting process.
- The elected government chooses and implements the policy vector $(\tau_1, G_1)$, and the game ends.

We will now proceed to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) in pure strategies of this dynamic political game.

4 Characterization of the Equilibrium

4.1 Equilibrium in the Last Period ($t = 1$)

Since we have a finite game, we solve the model by backward induction by computing the political equilibrium in the last period, $t = 1$. In particular, we characterize the equilibrium of the subgame played after elections have been held and a government appointed, for every possible history.

If in office at period 1, party $J \in \{P, R\}$ implements the fiscal policy solving the following problem

$$V_J^1(\theta_1, \rho_1 = J) = \max_{\tau_1, G_1} \left\{(1 - \tau_1) a^J(\theta_1) + G_1 + \delta\right\}$$

s.t. (2),

where $V_J^1(\theta_1, \rho_1 = J)$ denotes the maximized utility of party $J$ from being in power, conditionally on $\theta_1$ that has been chosen by the government in office at time $t = 0$.

We now need to derive the preferred fiscal policies of the two political parties at time $t = 1$. It is immediate that the Right’s preferred tax rate is equal to zero.
**Proposition 1** A right-wing government always sets taxes at the level $\tau_1^{R} \equiv 0$ and provides no public good, so that $G_1^{R} \equiv 0$.

In words, a right-wing government provides no public good since it is not optimal for the rich to spend fiscal revenues in $G$. Consequently, the per period utilities of the poor and the rich when party $R$ is in power are respectively

$$u_{1}^{i,p} (\eta_1, \varepsilon_1^i, \theta_1 | \rho_1 = R) = \theta_1 a^p,$$

and

$$u_{1}^{i,r} (\eta_1, \varepsilon_1^i, \theta_1 | \rho_1 = R) = a^r,$$

where these expressions incorporate the normalization to zero of the ideological bias in favor of party $R$ (see (5)).

It is also clear that if the Left is in power it will set taxes at their maximum possible level $\tau$, since they are not distortionary below that level.

**Proposition 2** Conditionally on $\theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1]$, a left-wing government implements the following fiscal policy: $\tau_1^{P} = \tau$ and $G_1^{P} = \tau a_1 (\theta_1)$.

Therefore, the per period utility of a low-skill producer when $P$ is in power is

$$u_{1}^{i,p} (\eta_1, \varepsilon_1^i, \theta_1 | \rho_1 = P) = \theta_1 a^p + \Delta_1^{P} (\theta_1) + \varepsilon_1^i + \eta_1,$$

where

$$\Delta_1^{P} (\theta_1) = G_1^{P} - \hat{\tau} \theta_1 a^p = \hat{\tau} \lambda (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) > 0,$$

denotes the net value of fiscal redistribution for the poor. Since the Right provides no fiscal redistribution, $\Delta_1^{P} (\theta_1)$ also represents the relative net economic gain for the low-skill agents from voting for party $P$ rather than for party $R$. Similarly, the per period utility of a high-skill producer from voting for party $P$ reads

$$u_{1}^{i,r} (\eta_1, \varepsilon_1^i, \theta_1 | \rho_1 = P) = a^r + \Delta_1^{r} (\theta_1) + \varepsilon_1^i + \eta_1,$$

where

$$\Delta_1^{r} (\theta_1) = G_1^{P} - \hat{\tau} a^r = -\hat{\tau} (1 - \lambda) (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) < 0,$$

is the net value of fiscal redistribution for the rich.
A central aspect is that $\Delta^P_1(\theta_1)$ is decreasing in $\theta_1$. This is because as $\theta_1$ increases inequality falls as the poor get richer, so that less is gained from redistribution. This result is important because it implies that the Left can strategically increase its comparative politico-economic value (relative to the Right) for the lower class, $\Delta^P_1(\theta_1)$, by reducing the pre-tax income of the unskilled, i.e. of its natural constituency.

For similar reasons, $\Delta^r_1(\theta_1)$ is increasing in $\theta_1$.

Citizen $i \in \{p, r\}$ votes for party $P$ at time 1 if

$$U^i_1(\eta_1, \varepsilon^i_1, \theta_1|\rho_1 = P) \geq U^i_1(\eta_1, \varepsilon^i_1, \theta_1|\rho_1 = R).$$

Using (6) and (8), we can see that this is equivalent to

$$\varepsilon^i_1 \geq -\Delta^J_1(\theta_1) - \eta_1,$$

for $J \in \{p, r\}$.

Since $\Delta^p_1(\theta_1) > 0$ and $\Delta^r_1(\theta_1) < 0$, and the distribution of $\varepsilon$ is the same across income groups, this formula implies that for any value of $\eta_1$, the Left always gets a greater proportion of votes among the poor than among the rich. Given the distributional assumptions on the ideological shocks, we can next compute the total number of votes that party $P$ obtains in state $(\eta_1, \theta_1)$:

$$S^P(\eta_1, \theta_1) = (1 - \lambda) \left[ 1 - F(-\Delta^p_1(\theta_1) - \eta_1) \right] + \lambda \left[ 1 - F(-\Delta^r_1(\theta_1) - \eta_1) \right].$$

The first term on the right hand side of (14) is the number of votes coming from the poor, and the second represents the votes coming from the rich.

The Left wins the election if $S^P(\eta_1, \theta_1) > 1/2$. Since $S^P(\eta_1, \theta_1)$ is strictly increasing in $\eta_1$, that is equivalent to $\eta > \eta^*_1(\theta_1)$, where the cutoff $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$ is defined by $S^P(\eta^*_1(\theta_1), \theta_1) = 1/2$, or equivalently

$$(1 - \lambda) F(-\Delta^P_1(\theta_1) - \eta^*_1(\theta_1)) + \lambda F(-\Delta^r_1(\theta_1) - \eta^*_1(\theta_1)) = 1/2.$$ 

The following proposition summarizes the results obtained up to this point.

**Proposition 3** Conditionally on the realization of the aggregate ideological shock $\eta_1$, the equilibrium of the subgame beginning at period $t = 1$ is the following.

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25 This depends on the assumption that taxes are proportional or more generally that the tax schedule does not allow the poor to entirely expropriate the rich. Otherwise the gains from redistribution would be equal to the income of the rich which is independent of $\theta$.

26 We denote with $\varepsilon^{ip}_1$ ($\varepsilon^{ir}_1$) the value of the idiosyncratic ideological shock of a poor (rich) citizen $i$ for party $P$ at time 1 when this is necessary for clarity.

27 In the case where $S^P(\eta_1, \theta_1) = 1/2$, we assume both parties win with probability 1/2.
1. If $\eta_1 < \eta^*_1(\theta_1)$, party $R$ wins the elections with certainty, and implements the fiscal policy described by Proposition 1.

2. If $\eta_1 > \eta^*_1(\theta_1)$, party $P$ wins the elections with certainty, and implements the fiscal policy described by Proposition 2.

3. If $\eta_1 = \eta^*_1(\theta_1)$, party $R$ and party $P$ both win the elections with probability $1/2$, and the winner implements its preferred fiscal policy.

Proposition 3 allows us to compute the ex-ante probability of winning the election as a function of $\theta_1$.

**Corollary 1** The ex-ante probability that party $R$ wins the elections in the final period is

$$
\sigma^R_1(\theta_1) \equiv \Pr \{S^P(\eta_1, \theta_1) < 1/2\} = \Pr \{\eta < \eta^*_1(\theta_1)\} = \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)),
$$

(16)

and ex-ante the probability that party $P$ wins the elections is

$$
\sigma^P_1(\theta_1) \equiv 1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)).
$$

(17)

We conclude the description of the equilibrium at period $t = 1$ by stating some additional results which will be used to characterize the equilibrium at period $t = 0$. The proofs are in the Appendix.

**Lemma 1** In the equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period $t = 1$, $\eta^*_1(\theta_1) < 0$ for all $\theta_1$.

The intuition for this result is simple. The low-skill workers are more numerous than the high-skilled, and as the former are on average more inclined to vote for the Left than for the Right (due to the more convenient fiscal policy), the two parties obtain the same number of votes in equilibrium if there is a sufficiently large aggregate ideological shock in favor of the Right. This is the case when the realization of $\eta$ falls below some negative threshold.

The following lemma clarifies how the threshold $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$ depends on $\theta_1$.

**Lemma 2** In the equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period $t = 1$, $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)\equiv d\eta^*_1(\theta_1)/d\theta_1 > 0$ for all $\theta_1$.

Intuitively, the threshold $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$ is increasing in the last period productivity of low-skill agents because as these become richer, they gain less from fiscal redistribution, and therefore they are less inclined to voting for the Left. A greater $\theta_1$ also increases the fraction of rich
voting for the left. But, as the rich are less numerous than the poor, the net effect is that the overall probability of the Left winning the election falls with $\frac{1}{\theta_1}$. This is a key result of the model, which will explain why, under some conditions, the Left may choose to reduce the income of its own natural constituency in order to consolidate its own future political power.

4.2 Equilibrium in the Initial Period ($t = 0$)

We now complete the backward induction solution of the political game by computing the equilibrium of the subgame of the stage game played at time $t = 0$ after elections have been held and a government appointed. Conditionally on the exogenous level of $\theta_0$, the optimal policy of party $J$ at that point in time solves the following problem

$$V_0^J (\theta_0) = \max_{\tau_0, G_0, \theta_1} \left\{ \left[ (1 - \tau_0) a_0^J (\theta_0) + G_0 \right] + \delta + \beta \mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right] \right\},$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right]$ is the expected continuation value (with respect to the realization of $\eta$) of party $J$ conditionally on $\theta_1$, defined as

$$\mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right] = \int V_1^J (\theta_1|\rho_1 = P) \phi (\eta) d\eta.$$  

Using Corollary 1, this value can be rewritten as

$$\mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right] = \sigma^P_{\eta} (\theta_1) V_1^J (\theta_1|\rho_1 = P) + \sigma^R_{\eta} (\theta_1) V_1^J (\theta_1|\rho_1 = R). \quad (18)$$

Since the choice of $\theta_1$ is made at no resource cost, it can be separated from the fiscal policy decisions, which are still described by Propositions 1 and 2. Party $J$ chooses the optimal value of $\theta_1$ solving the following maximization problem

$$\theta_1^* = \arg \max_{\theta_1 \in [\theta_{c,1}]} \mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right].$$

Using Propositions 1 and 2, and Corollary 1, the expected continuation value $\mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^J (\eta, \theta_1) \right]$ of party $J = P$ in period 1 can be written as

$$V_1^P (\theta_1) = \mathbb{E}_{\eta} \left[ V_1^P (\eta, \theta_1) \right] = \theta_1 a^P + [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1))] \left[ \delta + \Delta^P_1 (\theta_1) \right], \quad (19)$$

and it is the case that

$$\frac{\partial V_1^P (\theta_1)}{\partial \theta_1} = a^P + [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1))] \hat{\tau} \lambda a^P - \hat{\phi}(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)) \eta^*_1(\theta_1) \left[ \delta + \Delta^P_1 (\theta_1) \right]. \quad (20)$$

The sign of this derivative is generally ambiguous. The first term is positive since it reflects the standard welfare gain that the low-skill agents obtain when they become more productive.
at the margin, which is partially internalized by party $P$. The second term is negative since it reflects the loss in fiscal redistribution that the low-skilled experience when their productivity becomes higher, whenever the Left is in power.\footnote{If the Right is in power in period 1 there is no fiscal redistribution, and therefore this effect is absent. Also note that the sum of the first two terms is positive and represents the expected increase in the ex-post tax income and transfers following an increase in $\theta_1$.} The third term is also negative (note that $\eta_1'(\theta_1) > 0$ from Lemma 2), as it represents the loss of party $P$ due to the reduced chances of winning the elections in period 1 when $\theta_1$ increases. This utility loss includes both the office rent (which the left party $P$ does not get if the Right is in power) and the fiscal transfer potentially benefiting the lower class (which party $P$ internalizes due to its partial altruism).

Similarly, the expected value $E_{\eta}[V^R_J(\eta, \theta_1)]$ of party $J = R$ in period 1 is given by

$$V^R_1(\theta_1) = a^R + \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))\delta + [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \Delta^*_1(\theta_1),$$

and the derivative of the expression with respect to our policy variable of interest reads

$$\frac{\partial V^R_1(\theta_1)}{\partial \theta_1} = [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \tilde{v}(1-\lambda)a^R + \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))\eta_1''(\theta_1) [\delta - \Delta^*_1(\theta_1)] > 0.$$ \hfill (21)

Equation (21), unlike (20), contains only positive terms, which means that the objective function of the Right party is strictly increasing in $\theta_1$. A higher value of $\theta_1$ increases the utility of party $R$ directly by increasing both the income of the poor and the aggregate income, which leads to lower taxes for the rich when the Left is in power (first term of (21)), and indirectly by increasing the probability of electoral victory of the right-wing party (second term in (21)).

The following proposition summarizes these results.

**Lemma 3** When in power in the initial period ($t = 0$), party $R$ always sets the value of $\theta_1$ at level

$$\theta^R_1 = 1,$$

while the optimal value of $\theta_1$ for party $P$ is the solution to the following maximization problem

$$\theta^*_1 \equiv \theta^P_1 = \arg \max_{\theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1]} V^P_1(\theta_1) = \theta_1 a^P + [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1))] [\delta + \Delta^*_1(\theta_1)].$$ \hfill (22)

**Remark 1** Since the program of party $P$ involves the maximization of a continuous function over a compact interval, it has a solution by Weierstrass theorem. If there is more than one solution, we invoke a standard Pareto efficiency argument to select the largest value of $\theta_1$ as the equilibrium value when the Left is in power.
Do equilibria with a value of $\theta_1$ strictly lower than 1 exist? Intuitively, looking at the RHS of (20) suggests that this will be the case for $\delta$ large enough. This is established by the following proposition (see Appendix for proof).

**Proposition 4** There exists a finite value of $\delta$ independent of $\theta_1$, that we call $\delta^*$, such that $V^P_1(\theta_1; \delta)$ is everywhere decreasing in $\theta_1$ for any $\delta > \delta^*$. In this case, the political rents are sufficiently large to ensure that the program of party $P$ has the lower corner solution $\theta_1^* = \theta^L$.

We now discuss how election results are determined in the initial period ($t = 0$).

Anticipating the policy vector potentially chosen by each party, a low-skill citizen, $i = p$, votes for party $P$ at time 0 if

$$U^{i,p}_0(\eta_0, \varepsilon^{i,p}_0, \theta_0 | \rho_0 = P) \geq U^{i,p}_0(\eta_0, \varepsilon^{i,p}_0, \theta_0 | \rho_0 = R),$$

where the left (right) hand side is the expected discounted maximized utility of a poor citizen when the left-wing (right-wing) party is in power. This condition can be rewritten as

$$(1 - \hat{\tau})\theta_0 a^p + \hat{\tau} [\lambda a^r + (1 - \lambda)\theta_0 a^p] + \varepsilon^{i,p}_0 + \eta_0 + \beta U^p_1(\theta_1^*) \geq \theta_0 a^p + \beta U^p_1(1),$$

where $U^J_t(\theta_1)$ denote the expected utility of group $J \in \{p, r\}$ at time $t = 1$ conditional on the choice of $\theta_1$ by the government in power at $t = 0$.

From the analysis of the voting decision of the poor, that we do not repeat in detail as it is similar to the one presented above for period 1, we obtain that a poor votes for the Left if

$$\varepsilon^{i,p}_0 \geq -\Delta^p_0(\theta_0) - \eta_0,$$

where

$$\Delta^p_0(\theta_0) = \hat{\tau}\lambda(a^r - \theta_0 a^p) + \beta [U^p_1(\theta_1^*) - U^p_1(1)]. \quad (23)$$

Similarly, a rich citizen votes for the party $P$ at time 0 if

$$\varepsilon^{i,r}_0 \geq -\Delta^r_0(\theta_0) - \eta_0,$$

with\footnote{It is worth noting that while $\Delta^0_r(\theta_0)$ is always negative since $U^r_1(\theta_1^*) < U^r_1(1)$, $\Delta^0_r(\theta_0)$ may have an ambiguous sign as $U^r_1(\theta_1^*)$ may be lower than $U^r_1(1)$.}

$$\Delta^r_0(\theta_0) \equiv -\hat{\tau}(1 - \lambda)(a^r - \theta_0 a^p) + \beta [U^r_1(\theta_1^*) - U^r_1(1)] < 0. \quad (24)$$

It is worth noting that these conditions differ from those derived for the second period of the game since they are *dynamic* voting rules. When voting at date 0 people take into account
the fact that the elected government will subsequently choose the productivity level of the poor \( \theta_1 \) in a discretionary fashion. That effect is absent in the voting game at \( t = 1 \).

In an equilibrium where the Left is expected to choose \( \theta_1^* = 1 \) if in power, the continuation value implicitly promised by both parties to the rich and to the poor is the same. In this case, the structure of the voting rules in the first and second period coincide and citizens discriminate between the two parties depending only on the present welfare that they promise to the voters. This is an equilibrium with no political entrenchment which has two important features. First, it is Pareto efficient since potential output is maximized. Second, and more subtly, the equilibrium features no persistence of political power, in the sense that the probability that each party is in power at time \( t = 1 \) does not depend on which party is in power in the first period. When instead the Left is expected to choose \( \theta_1^* < 1 \) if in power, the continuation value promised by the two parties to the rich and to the poor differs. This is an equilibrium with political entrenchment and it is characterized by the fact that the left-wing party deliberately reduces the income of its constituency in order to consolidate its power. This equilibrium has two important features. First, it is Pareto inefficient since potential output is not maximized. Second, there is persistence of political power, in the sense that the probability that party \( P \) is power at time \( t = 1 \), \( \sigma_1^P(\theta_1^*) \), depends on which party is in power at time \( t = 0 \). In particular,

\[
\Pr \{ \rho_1 = P|\rho_0 = P \} = \sigma_1^P(\theta_1^*) > \Pr \{ \rho_1 = P|\rho_0 = R \} = \sigma_1^R(1)
\]

for all \( \theta_1^* < 1 \), as \( \sigma_1^P(\theta_1^*) = 1 - \Phi(\eta_0^*(\theta_1^*)) \) and \( \eta_0^*(\theta_1^*) > 0 \).

To complete the analysis, we need to compute the number of votes that party \( P \) obtains in the first period. This is given by

\[
S^P(\eta_0, \theta_0) = (1 - \lambda) [1 - F(-\Delta_0^P(\theta_0) - \eta_0)] + \lambda [1 - F(-\Delta_0^R(\theta_0) - \eta_0)] .
\]

(25)

As before, party \( P \) wins the election if \( S^P(\eta_0, \theta_0) > 1/2 \), which is the case when \( \eta > \eta_0^*(\theta_0) \), where \( \eta_0^*(\theta_0) \) is defined as the value of \( \eta_0 \) satisfying the condition\(^{30} \)

\[
S^P(\eta_0^*(\theta_0), \theta_0) = 1/2, \quad (26)
\]

with \( S^P(\cdot) \) defined by (25).

The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium in the first period of the game.

\(^{30}\)Note that \( \eta_0^* \) also depends on \( \theta_1 \) since \( \Delta_0^P(\theta_0) \) and \( \Delta_0^R(\theta_0) \) (see respectively (23) and (24)) are affected by this state variable. To simplify the notation, we will use \( \eta_0^*(\theta_0) \) rather than \( \eta_0^*(\theta_0, \theta_1^*) \) when this does not make any confusion.
Proposition 5  The equilibrium of the subgame beginning at period $t = 0$ is as follows:

1. If $\eta_0 < \eta_0^* (\theta_0)$, party $R$ wins elections, implements the fiscal policy ($\tau_0^R = 0, G_0^R = 0$), and sets $\theta_1^R = 1$.

2. If $\eta_0 > \eta_0^* (\theta_0)$, party $P$ wins elections and implements the fiscal policy ($\tau_0^P = \hat{\tau}, G_0^P = \tau \bar{a}_0(\theta_0)$). Moreover, party $P$ chooses $\theta_1^P = \theta_1^* \in [\theta^L, 1]$ as defined in Lemma 3.

3. If $\eta_0 = \eta_0^* (\theta_0)$, party $R$ wins the elections with probability $1/2$ and implements the policy described in case 1; party $P$ wins the elections with probability $1/2$ and implements the policy described in case 2.

Proof. In the text. □

The equilibrium at time 0 defined in Proposition 5 is similar to that one of period 1 contained in Proposition 3. Furthermore, the threshold $\eta_0^*(\theta_0)$ is increasing in $\theta_0$, since the potential gain from fiscal redistribution, and therefore the bias of the low-skill agents in favor of the Left, decreases as their pre-tax income increases relative to the average income. Consequently, there is persistence in the value of $\theta$, in addition to persistence in political power: a greater $\theta_0$ makes it more likely that the Right wins at $t = 0$, which in turn raises the equilibrium value of $\theta_1$, unless one is in an equilibrium without entrenchment.

5  Comparative Statics

We now move to analyze how some parameters of the model change the degree of entrenchment of the Left, namely how they affect the level of productivity of the low-skilled chosen by party $P$ when in power in the initial period. In particular, we determine how $\theta_1^*$ changes when there is a variation in the benefit $\delta$ of the party from being in power, a variation in the exogenous component of the balance of power between Left and Right, and a change in state capacity $\hat{\tau}$.

As the objective function (19) of the Left is not generally concave in $\theta_1$, we cannot apply the standard methods (based on the implicit differentiation of the first order condition) to characterize the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium. For this reason the analysis will be conducted using the techniques of monotone comparative statics (e.g., Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; Topkis, 1998).

5.1  An Increase in Office Rents

An increase in the rents $\delta$ from power always increase the incentive of the Left for entrenchment, namely it leads party $P$ to choose a (weakly) lower level of $\theta_1$. This result comes from the fact
that \( V^P_1(\theta_1; \delta) \) is submodular in \((\theta_1, \delta)\), i.e., \( \partial^2 V^P_1(\theta_1; \delta) / \partial \theta_1 \partial \delta < 0 \), so that \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \delta \leq 0 \) by Topkis’ theorem (Topkis, 1998). In fact, from (20) we obtain that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V^P_1(\theta_1; \delta)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \delta} = -\phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)) \eta''_1(\theta_1),
\]

which is always negative. By Topkis’ theorem, this implies that \( \theta^*_1 \) is nonincreasing in \( \delta \) (i.e., \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \delta \leq 0 \)).

The intuition for this result is straightforward. As the gains from being in office increase, party \( P \) will want to increase the probability of winning the elections at time 1, which is possible by decreasing the pre-tax income of its constituency (namely by choosing a lower value of \( \theta_1 \)).

Greater office rents thus make it more likely that the Left wants to entrench in a way harmful to its own constituency. Note, however, that even if \( \delta = 0 \) it could be that \( \partial V^P_1(\theta_1) / \partial \theta_1 < 0 \) if \( \eta''_1(\theta_1) \) is sufficiently large (see 20)). This would mean that the poor themselves (under a veil of ignorance about their ideological taste shocks) would be willing to forego some pre-tax income in exchange for a sufficiently large increase in the probability of the Left winning the election, and therefore of the likelihood of benefitting from redistribution.

5.2 Effects of the Inter-Party Balance of Power

We now consider the effect of an exogenous variation in the balance of power in favor of the Left on \( \theta^*_1 \). A way to model this bias is by considering a shift to the right in the distribution function of the ideological bias \( \varepsilon \) of the citizens for party \( P \). Formally, the cumulative distribution function of \( \varepsilon \) can be rewritten as \( F_\nu(\varepsilon) \equiv F(\varepsilon - \nu) \), with the density function equal to \( f(\varepsilon - \nu) \equiv F'(\varepsilon - \nu) \), where \( \nu \) is the mean of the distribution (\( \nu = 0 \) corresponds to our baseline model).

An increase in \( \nu \) implies a stronger bias in favor of the Left. In order to determine the sign of \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \nu \), we explore whether \( V^P_1(\theta_1; \nu) \) is supermodular or submodular in \((\theta_1, \nu)\). Using (20) as well as (15), we get

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V^P_1(\theta_1; \nu)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \nu} = -\phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)) \hat{\nu} \lambda \alpha^P + \phi'(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)) \eta''_1(\theta_1) [\delta + \Delta^P_1(\theta_1)].
\]

The first term in (27) is negative, which implies that \( \theta^*_1 \) is nonincreasing in \( \nu \) (i.e., \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \nu \leq 0 \)), and it represents the appropriation effect. A higher \( \nu \) means that citizens have a positive bias in favor of the Left, that will then be in power more often. This implies that, ceteris paribus,

---

31 The notation used to write the expression of the value function \( V^P_1(\theta_1; \delta) \) reflects that \( \theta_1 \) is an endogenous state variable whereas \( \delta \) represents an exogenous parameter of the model.

32 Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 are no longer valid. However, if \( \nu \) is not too large, the critical property of the equilibrium that the marginal density of swing voters is lower among the rich than among the poor, which is behind Lemmas 1 and 2, still holds.

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the poor will get income redistribution more often and, therefore, that the cost of entrenchment (i.e., of a lower pre-tax income) for party $P$, that internalizes to some extent the utility of the poor, is smaller.\textsuperscript{33} This leads that party to entrench more, namely to choose a lower level of $\theta_1$. The second term in (27) is instead positive, which leads to $\theta_1$ being nondecreasing in $\nu$ (i.e., $\partial \theta_1/\partial \nu \geq 0$), and it represents the decreasing marginal political return effect. A positive bias in favor of party $P$ (higher $\nu$) reduces the local density of swing voters gained by entrenchment, as a more extreme aggregate preference shock in favor of the right is needed for the election to be in a knife-edge situation.\textsuperscript{34} Given the existence of fewer citizens at the margin (i.e., $\phi'(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))\eta_1''(\theta_1) > 0$), a reduction of $\theta_1$ would lead to a lower increase in the votes gained by the Left, which means that the marginal political return from entrenchment (a lower $\theta_1$) decreases with $\nu$. This leads to a higher $\theta_1$ and to less entrenchment.

As the sign of (27), and therefore of $\partial \theta_1/\partial \nu$, is generally ambiguous, so will be the effect of a positive bias in favor of the Left on entrenchment. However, one can observe that the second term in (27) depends on $\delta$ while the first term does not. This means that when the rents from office are sufficiently high, the decreasing marginal political return effect is likely to dominate over the appropriation effect, which implies that a positive bias of the citizens for the Left leads to less entrenchment ($\partial^2 V_1^P(\theta_1; \nu)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \nu > 0$ and $\partial \theta_1/\partial \nu \geq 0$). The intuition is the following. The greater the rent $\delta$, the smaller the weight of net income in the politicians' utility relative to that of being in office. Since the appropriation effect does not depend on being in office, the decreasing marginal political return effect dominates for large office rents.

### 5.3 The Effect of State Fiscal Capacity

Along similar lines it is possible to analyze the effect of a higher state capacity $\tilde{\tau}$ on the entrenchment of the Left, by computing the cross-partial derivative $\partial^2 V_1^P(\theta_1; \tilde{\tau})/\partial \theta_1 \partial \tilde{\tau}$. Such a derivation is performed in Appendix 10.4. It turns out that the appropriation effect and the decreasing marginal political return effect again come into play, with conflicting signs.

- On the one hand, greater state capacity again raises the level of redistribution, making it less costly for the poor to bear a reduction in $\theta_1$. This is the appropriation effect, which tends to increase entrenchment (reduce $\theta_1$) when $\tilde{\tau}$ is greater.

- On the other hand, the decreasing marginal political returns effect also comes into play.

\textsuperscript{33}It is useful to remind that income redistribution partially offset the income loss of the poor generated by a lower level of their productivity.

\textsuperscript{34}Technically, this is due to the fact that $\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)/\partial \nu < 0$ and Assumption 3 which implies that $\phi'(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) > 0$ as $\eta_1^*(\theta_1) < 0$. 

---

26
Its sign is ambiguous in this case, though, because there is now an extensive margin (the Left is more popular when \( \hat{\tau} \) is greater, hence tie situations arise for more extreme aggregate party preference shocks in favor of the Right, hence the marginal density of swing voters is lower) as well as an intensive margin (the level of \( \hat{\tau} \) affects how responsive an individual voter is to a change in \( \theta_1 \)).

- For the same reasons as in the preceding subsection, the decreasing political return effect dominates if office rents are sufficiently high, but, as its sign is ambiguous, this does not deliver a clear-cut prediction on the sign of \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \hat{\tau} \).

Other comparative statics exercises are possible. For example, a higher degree of income inequality has an effect on the choice of \( \theta_1 \) very similar to that of state capacity. The analysis is reported in Appendix 10.5.

The following lemma summarizes the results obtained above.

**Lemma 4** The preferred level of productivity of the low-skill producers \( \theta^*_1 \) from the point of view of party \( P \) has the following features.

1. An increase in the rents \( \delta \) from office (weakly) reduces \( \theta^*_1 \) (i.e., \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \delta \leq 0 \)).

2. A positive bias \( \nu \) in favor of the Left has an ambiguous effect on \( \theta^*_1 \), and reduces entrenchment when the rents from office are sufficiently high (i.e., \( \partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \nu \geq 0 \)).

3. A higher level of state capacity \( \hat{\tau} \) has in general an ambiguous effect on \( \theta^*_1 \).

### 5.4 Some Special Cases

We can obtain sharper results concerning the comparative statics properties of the political equilibrium if the following additional restrictions are imposed on the functional form of the densities of the two ideological shocks. The following conditions guarantee that the appropriability effect dominates, by limiting the variation of the marginal density of swing voters (which drives the decreasing political returns effect).

**Condition 1.** The density of the aggregate popularity shock \( \eta \) has the following property:

\[
\phi' (x) / \phi (x) \leq 1 / \left[ \delta + \Delta^p (\theta^L) \right].
\]

\(^{35}\text{Note that this condition is satisfied, in particular, if the aggregate popularity shock has a uniform distribution (and therefore } \phi' (x) = 0 \text{ for any } x, \text{ as it is often assumed in political economy models based on probabilistic voting.}\)
**Condition 2.** The density of the idiosyncratic popularity shock $\varepsilon$ is such that $|f'(x) / f(x)|$ is weakly increasing in $|x|$.$^{36}$

If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, it is straightforward to verify the following results (see Appendix for proof).

**Lemma 5** The preferred level of productivity of the low-skill producers $\theta^*_1$ from the point of view of party $P$ has the following features.

1. Same as Point 1 in Lemma 4 regardless on distributional assumption.

2. A positive bias $\nu$ in favor of the Left increases entrenchment (i.e., $\partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \nu \leq 0$).

3. A higher level of state capacity $\hat{\tau}$ increases entrenchment (i.e., $\partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \hat{\tau} \leq 0$).

Point 2 in Lemma 5 is particularly interesting since it provides one mechanism through which less political competition (or, more precisely, greater exogenous insulation of the Left when in office) may lead to more distortions, in the form of higher equilibrium entrenchment. In this respect, our result is consistent with the recent finding of Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2012) that politicians facing a higher “effective discount factor” (which will be the case if they expect to stay in power longer) are likely to implement macroeconomic policies featuring more, rather than less, political distortions. This conclusion contradicts one of the main insights of the previous literature (e.g., Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997),$^{37}$ according to which more stability of power should be conducive to better policies and allocations of resources, by alleviating the political agency problem arising between voters and politicians.

Another special case of interest is the one obtaining when state capacity is small enough.

**Lemma 6** If $\hat{\tau}$ is small enough, higher state capacity generates more political entrenchments.

Intuitively, as state capacity tends to zero, only the appropriation effect of higher state capacity on entrenchment survives, whereas the decreasing marginal political return becomes second order as both parties nearly implement the same policy; hence, equilibrium entrenchment is unambiguously higher.

$^{36}$Note that a number of important continuous distribution has this property, including the Gaussian and the double-exponential distribution.

$^{37}$In an early contribution, Rogoff and Siebert (1988) find that more political insulation of the incumbent government due to an exogenous increase in its popularity does not necessarily lead to a damped policy cycle.
Lemma 5 (Point 3) and Lemma 6 are of special interests since they imply that higher state capacity is not necessarily beneficial for the society but that, under some conditions, it may actually turn out to reduce its welfare. Specifically, according to our model, higher state capacity may be socially harmful by giving to the government currently in power more incentives to consolidate its own future power. Note also that since a low level of state capacity is characteristic of developing economies, Lemma 6 suggests that, at the margin, an autonomous increase in state capacity, is particularly likely to have harmful consequences for developing countries. While the conventional wisdom view (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009) is that higher state capacity is generally socially beneficial, our result is more in line with Acemoglu (2010) who makes the related point (but based on a very different rationale) that an autonomous increment in state capacity, not accompanied by an appropriate change in political institutions, may well turn to be socially harmful.

6 The Incentive of the Left to Limit Entrenchment Policies

In our analysis we have assumed that $\theta_1$ has an exogenous lower bound at $\theta^L > 0$. When this constraint is binding, i.e. $\theta^*_1 = \theta^L$, a lower value of $\theta^L$ means that the Left potentially has a greater capacity to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes if it is in power in the initial period; remember that the higher the reduction of income of the poor, the higher the probability that the Left wins the elections in the following period. Nevertheless, lower values of $\theta^L$ may also turn against the left-wing party because the low-skill citizens have lower incentives to vote for this party in the first period since entrenchment reduces their future income. Therefore, if the Left could freely set the value of $\theta^L$ before the first elections are held, it would not necessarily choose a low value or the minimum possible one ($\theta^L = 0$). In other words, there can be situations where it is optimal for the left-wing party to commit not to reduce the welfare of its own constituency beyond a certain point in the future in order not to become too much unpopular at the first electoral round. In this Section we analyze when this is the case.

To make this point, we consider the case where $\theta^L$ is endogenous and chosen by the Left before the first elections are held, and analyze under what conditions this party prefers to constrain itself by choosing relatively high values of $\theta^L$. In order to simplify the analysis and make it more transparent, we focus on the case where the left-wing party prefers committing to not undertaking entrenchment policies in the future, which corresponds to choosing a value of $\theta^L$ equal to 1.
The maximized expected utility of the Left at \( t = 0 \) is given by
\[
V^P_0(\theta_0, \theta^*_1) = [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^*_1))] \left[ \theta_0 a^p + \hat{\tau} \lambda(\alpha^r - \theta_0 a^p) + \delta + \beta V^P_1(\theta^*_1) \right] \\
+ \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^*_1)) \left[ \theta_0 a^p + \beta V^P_1(1) \right],
\]
where we have emphasized that \( \eta^*_0 \), defined by (26), also depends on the optimal value of the \( \theta_1 \) chosen by the party in power in the first period and reported in Lemma 3. The first term of (28) represents the expected utility that the Left obtains if it wins the first round of elections; this event occurs with probability \( 1 - \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^*_1)) \), \( \theta_1 \) is set at the level \( \theta^*_1 \in [\theta^L, 1] \) and \( V^P_1(\theta^*_1) \) is the expected utility of the Left at \( t = 1 \) as defined by (19). The second term of (28) is the expected utility of this party if the Right wins the first round of elections, which happens with probability \( \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^*_1)) \); this party sets \( \theta_1 = 1 \) and \( V^P_1(1) \) is the expected utility of the Left at \( t = 1 \) as defined by (19) with \( \theta_1 = 1 \).

We consider the case where the constraint \( \theta^*_1 \geq \theta^L \) is binding, so that the Left sets \( \theta^*_1 = \theta^L \) when in power in the first period. A sufficient condition ensuring this is that \( \partial V^P_1(\theta_1)/\partial \theta_1 < 0 \) for all \( \theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1] \); Proposition 4 clarifies that this is always the case when the office rents are sufficiently high (\( \delta \geq \delta^* \)). We then analyze under what conditions the Left prefers setting \( \theta^L = 1 \) before elections are held in the first period, so giving up the possibility of pursuing entrenchment policies once in power. A sufficient condition for this result is that \( V^P_0(\theta^L) \) is monotonically increasing in \( \theta^L \) for all \( \theta^L \in [0, 1] \).

If \( \theta^*_1 = \theta^L \), then the value in (28) becomes
\[
V^P_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) = [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^L))] \left[ \theta_0 a^p + \hat{\tau} \lambda(\alpha^r - \theta_0 a^p) + \delta + \beta V^P_1(\theta^L) \right] \\
+ \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)) \left[ \theta_0 a^p + \beta V^P_1(1) \right],
\]
which implies that
\[
\frac{\partial V^P_0(\theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = [1 - \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta^L))] \beta \frac{\partial V^P_1(\theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} \\
- \Phi(\eta^*_0(\theta^L)) \left[ \hat{\tau} \lambda(\alpha^r - \theta_0 a^p) + \delta + \beta \left[ V^P_1(\theta^L) - V^P_1(1) \right] \right],
\]
where to simplify the notation we have omitted the dependency of \( \eta^*_0 \) and \( V^P_0 \) from \( \theta_0 \). The first component of (29) is negative since \( \partial V^P_1(\theta_1)/\partial \theta_1 < 0 \) for all \( \theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1] \), and it captures the fact that a higher \( \theta^L \) reduces the scope for future entrenchment. The second component can be shown to be positive at least for sufficiently small state capacity (see Appendix), and it captures the fact that by committing not to entrench in the future by choosing a higher \( \theta^L \), the Left increases its likelihood of winning the election at \( t = 0 \). Not surprisingly, then, the sign of \( \partial V^P_0(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L \) is in general ambiguous, but we can prove the following result.

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Lemma 7 If \( \tilde{\tau} \) is small enough and \( \delta \) is higher than a certain threshold (i.e., \( \delta > \delta^{**} \equiv \max\{\delta' \tilde{\tau}, \tilde{\delta}\} \), where \( \tilde{\delta} = \beta a^p \) and \( \delta^* \) is defined in Proposition 4), the Left prefers setting \( \theta^L = 1 \) (i.e., \( \partial V_P^P(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L > 0 \) for all \( \theta^L \in [0,1] \)), which means that party \( P \) would ex-ante prefer to give up the possibility of implementing entrenchment policies once in power.

Proof. See Appendix.

To conclude this section, we note that if instead we had considered an infinitely repeated voting game, this would have opened up the possibility of a no-entrenchment equilibrium whereby the poor would punish the Left if it deviated from such an equilibrium by voting for the right. However note that voting for the right is not subgame perfect (and therefore the corresponding implicit threat is not credible), unlike what is happening in the literature on dynamic oligopoly where punishment consists of a reversion to the non-cooperative repeated Nash outcome. It is thus a priori unclear how such an equilibrium would arise.

7 The Possibility of Entrenchment by the Right

The preceding discussion has focused on the Left’s incentives to pursue entrenchment policies. That is the most clear-cut example of entrenchment to the extent that the Left’s constituency is made captive by policies that reduce their welfare but makes them more dependent on the policies implemented by the Left. This does not mean, however, that the Right would not also entrench. However, given that the poor are a majority, this would mean getting more votes from the poor at the expense of losing some votes from the rich. Therefore, the Right would like to reduce inequality, meaning picking the highest possible value of \( \theta \) here. If some policy parameter reduced the pre-tax income of the rich, the right would like to do it. Thus the Right, like the Left, benefits from reducing the pre-tax income of its own constituency, but this is a false symmetry as in both cases the goal is to get more votes from the poor.

In the Appendix 10.9, we extend the baseline version of the model by assuming that the policy variable \( \theta \) also affects the income of the rich, and consider a number of different cases. The general message is that the Right wants to change \( \theta \) so as to reduce inequality. Depending on how \( \theta \) affects the income of the poor and the rich, this may imply pursuing inefficient policies that may harm the rich. For example, if the productivity of the high-skill workers goes up with \( \theta \) and is more responsive to \( \theta \) than that of the low-skilled, then the right will reduce \( \theta \) to increase its reelection probability, despite that the productivity of both groups falls.
8 The Importance of the Theory for Term Limits

According to the standard models of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) elections allow the citizens to (partially) solve the potential moral hazard problem of incumbent politicians, who can be induced not to appropriate for themselves too much resources by the implicit threat of non being reelected in the future. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) reach essentially the same conclusion in a model featuring a richer description of political institutions.

In these frameworks, a term limit is unambiguously welfare reducing since it forces voters not to reappoint a politician in office regardless on its performance. Therefore, under a term limit elections lose part of their efficacy as discipline device, which implies that the implicit contract offered by the voters to incumbent politicians must allow the latter to appropriate greater rents. This result raises the natural question of why many real world constitutions prescribe term limits for elections held either at the national or at the local level.

In this Section, we take a first step toward addressing this puzzle, by extending the baseline model assuming the existence of a constitutionally legislated term limit, which prevents an individual politician, but not its own party, in office in the first period to compete for office in the second period. The main result is that a term limit may be beneficial for society (i.e., the sum of rich and poor citizens) as it reduces the scope for political entrenchment.\footnote{We do not provide here a complete positive theory of term limits (which is beyond the purpose of this paper) since in our framework term limits will have only beneficial effects for society (i.e., they reduce the scope for entrenchment at zero cost). A general positive theory of term limits should incorporate both the benefits (such as those we emphasize) and the costs (such as those emphasized by the models of Barro, 1973, and of Ferejohn, 1986), and explain how the corresponding trade-off is resolved. See Smart and Sturm (2011) for a dynamic model of political agency where term limits may improve social welfare, but for a different rationale than reducing the scope for political entrenchment.}

Let us now assume that the politicians initially in power are partially altruistic toward their own party, in the sense that their utility in the second period of the game (where they are never in office due to the presence of a term limit) is equal to a fraction $\epsilon \in [0, 1]$ of the rents $\delta$ potentially appropriated by their party at that point. The parameter $\epsilon$ can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, it can reflect a genuine concern of the politicians for its own party. Alternatively, $\epsilon$ may capture the degree of “party discipline,” or “party strength” defined as the capacity of a party to align the preferences (and decisions) of its members in office to its own preferences (see Grossman and Helpman, 2008).\footnote{One way of achieving this goal could be, for instance, to offer to the former incumbent leader a premier position in the party’s apparatus.} More generally, this assumption is in the spirit of the observation (e.g., Alesina and Spear, 1988) that political parties are more durable, and have longer horizons, than politicians.
Formally, the lifetime preferences of a politician from party $J \in \{P, R\}$ under term limits can be represented as follows

$$v^J_{0,TL} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{1} \beta^t v^J_{t,TL},$$

with

$$v^J_{t,TL} = (1 - \tau_t) a^j_t + G_t + (t (\epsilon - 1) + 1) \delta_t,$$

for $t \in \{0, 1\}$.

The analysis of the equilibrium in presence of terms limits is straightforward since the objective function of party $J$ at time $t = 0$ is the same as in the baseline model, while it contains the term $\epsilon \delta$ rather than $\delta$ at time $t = 1$. Therefore, the structure of the equilibrium and its comparative statics properties are essentially the same as before. In particular, the objective function of party $P$ at time $t = 1$ is submodular in $\epsilon$; by standard monotone comparative statics results this implies that, conditionally on the presence of term limits, greater party discipline (i.e., higher $\epsilon$) leads to a (weakly) higher entrenchment as it induces the politicians to act more in line with the preferences of their own party. In the limit case of $\epsilon = 1$, party discipline is so strong that the politician in office at period $t = 0$ behaves as perfect agent of its own party, maximizing the party’s continuation value, and choosing the same value of $\theta_1$ that it would choose in absence of term limits (in this case, term limits are irrelevant). In the polar case of $\epsilon = 0$, conversely, a term limit is maximally effective since it induces a left-wing politician to act as perfect agent of its own constituency, as in the case were there are no political rents ($\delta = 0$), and therefore to set $\theta_1 = 1$. As already noted, though, entrenchment may still arise in such a case, but it would then also increase the expected welfare of the poor.

We conclude this section by observing that term limits themselves are not necessary a panacea to political moral hazard problems, as the extent to which term limits actually reduce the incentives of incumbent politicians to implement policies of entrenchment depends critically on the degree of party discipline.\(^\text{40}\)

9 Conclusions

This paper has posed a simple but, to the best of our knowledge, novel question: why do politicians occasionally implement policies damaging the economic interests of the same people that brought them in power?

\(^{40}\)It is interesting to notice in this regard that, consistently with our theory, term limits for the Presidency are widely prescribed by Latin American constitutions, and that in Latin America political parties tend to be remarkably weak organizations (see for example Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).
To address this question, we have proposed a simple dynamic model of voting with redistributive fiscal policy in a two-parties system. The Left party alone can credibly be expected to provide some redistribution in favor of the lower classes, but the economic gain of voting for it may be outweighed by the emergence of a strong ideological bias in favor of the Right in the future. We have found that policies that reduce the income of the poor relative to the average income, such as failing to upgrade the skills of the workers and preventing their erosion by new, skill-biased, technologies, paradoxically consolidates the political power of the Left. This is because these policies make the natural constituency of a left-wing party endogenously more dependent on it and, therefore, increase the support for the party itself. An equilibrium with entrenchment features relative economic stagnation and, in particular, falling unskilled wages, higher inequality, and persistence of the power of the Left. Such an equilibrium is not based on any form of myopia or irrationality of politicians or voters and is more likely to emerge, inter alia, when the political rents appropriated by the incumbent leaders are relatively high, which is the case for example in weakly-institutionalized polities (or in presidential governments with limited checks and balances).

Our comparative statics analysis has clarified how some features, such as state capacity, the bias in favor of a party and income inequality affect the incentive of parties to pursue entrenchment policies. We have discussed the case where the left-wing party may have the incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once in power. And we have shown that, in a more general framework, also the right-wing party may adopt policies damaging its own constituency in order to increase its electoral advantage and that entrenchment policies are not necessarily inefficient from a social perspective. Moreover, it is important to remark that the scope for political entrenchment is much wider than the one suggested by our simple model focusing only on the politics of pure income redistribution and can be applied to other scenarios, involving the provision of public goods such as, for example, national defence.

An interesting application of the theory in the area of the positive analysis of institutional design is the rationale for the existence of term limits in democratic constitutions. Our analysis suggests that term limits are potentially beneficial for society to the extent that they reduce the incentives of incumbent politicians in promoting socially inefficient entrenchment policies by reducing their political time-horizon. Nevertheless, the benefits from term limits may be related to other features of the political system, such as the degree of party discipline or the form of government and the electoral system. The endogenous determination of the politics of entrenchment, party discipline and term limits in a dynamic (infinite horizon) political setup seems to be a potentially interesting topic for future research.
10 Appendix

10.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Let \( \psi(h, \eta) \equiv (1 - \lambda)F(-\lambda h - \eta) + \lambda F((1 - \lambda)h - \eta). \) Clearly, \( \partial \psi / \partial \eta < 0. \) Furthermore, \( \psi(0, 0) = F(0) = 1/2 \) and \( \partial \psi(h, 0) / \partial h = \lambda(1 - \lambda)[f((1 - \lambda)h) - f(-\lambda h)]. \) Since \( \lambda < 1/2, \) \( |(1 - \lambda)h| > |\lambda h|. \) Therefore, \( f((1 - \lambda)h) < f(-\lambda h) \) and \( \partial \psi(h, 0) / \partial h < 0. \) Consequently, \( \psi(h, 0) < 1/2 \) for all \( h > 0. \) Next, note that \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \) is the solution to the equation \( \psi(\tau(a^r - \theta_1 a^p), \eta_1^*(\theta_1)) = 1/2. \) Since \( \psi(h, \cdot) \) is decreasing in \( \eta \) and \( \psi(\tau(a^r - \theta_1 a^p), 0) < 1/2, \) it must be that \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) < 0. \)

10.2 Proof of Lemma 2

Let us define

\[ z_P \equiv -\Delta_1^1(\theta_1) - \eta_1^*(\theta_1), \]  

and

\[ z_R \equiv -\Delta_1^1(\theta_1) - \eta_1^*(\theta_1). \]

From \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) < 0, (9), (11), \) and \( (15), \) we have \( z_R > 0 > z_P > -z_R. \) Differentiating \( (15) \) with respect to \( \theta_1, \) we get

\[ \eta_1^{*\prime}(\theta_1) = \lambda(1 - \lambda)a^p \tau \frac{f(z_P) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda)f(z_P) + \lambda f(z_R)}. \]  

Since \( |z_P| < |z_R|, \) from Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that \( f(z_P) > f(z_R) \) and, therefore, \( \eta_1^{*\prime}(\theta_1) > 0. \)

10.3 Proof of Proposition 4

Note that the function \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \) is continuously differentiable over the compact support \( [\theta_L, 1]. \) Its derivative is strictly positive and continuous. Furthermore, \( \phi(\cdot) \) is continuous, strictly positive, and has full support. Finally the function \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \) does not depend on \( \delta. \) Consequently, there exists an upper bound \( m \) independent of \( \delta \) such that \( -\phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^{*\prime}(\theta_1) < -m < 0 \) for \( \theta \in [\theta_L, 1]. \) By the same token, there exists \( M \) such that \( a^p - [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \tilde{\tau} \lambda a^p < M \) for \( \theta \in [\theta_L, 1]. \) Clearly, then, from \( (20), \) we have that \( \partial V_1^P(\theta_1) / \partial \theta_1 < M - m[\delta + \Delta_1^1(\theta_1)] < M - m\delta, \) which is strictly negative for \( \delta > M/m. \) QED.
10.4 The Effect of State Fiscal Capacity

We now analyze the effect of a higher state capacity \( \hat{\tau} \) on the entrenchment of the Left. Again, from (20), we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V^p(\theta_1; \hat{\tau})}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \hat{\tau}} = -\phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \lambda (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) - [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \lambda a^p + \hat{\tau} \lambda a^p \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \hat{\tau}} - \phi'(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^*(\theta_1) [\delta + \Delta_1^p(\theta_1)] \frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \hat{\tau}} - \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \frac{\partial^2 \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \hat{\tau}} [\delta + \Delta_1^p(\theta_1)].
\]

This expression includes two derivatives that we need to compute.

To determine \( \partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1) / \partial \hat{\tau} \), we derive the implicit function (15) defining \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \) with respect to \( \hat{\tau} \) and use (30) and (31), which leads to

\[
\frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \hat{\tau}} = -\lambda (1 - \lambda) (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) \frac{f(z_p) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda) f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)} < 0,
\]

as \( f(z_p) > f(z_R) \).

Moreover, differentiating the RHS of (32) with respect to \( \hat{\tau} \) we get

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \hat{\tau}} = \lambda (1 - \lambda) a^p \frac{f(z_p) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda) f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)} \left( (1 - \lambda) f(z_p) f'(z_R) + \lambda f(z_R) f'(z_p) \right) \left( (1 - \lambda) f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R) \right)^2
\]

which is generally ambiguous as the first term is positive, the second is ambiguous and the last term is positive since \( f'(z_p) > 0 \) and \( f'(z_R) < 0 \) (from \( z_R > 0 > z_p \) and Assumption 2).\(^{41}\)

\(^{41}\)Remember that when \( \theta_1 \) goes up, the benefits of redistribution fall. Therefore, the poor swing voter dislikes the Left less, while the rich one likes it less. Both swing voters become less extreme. (Remember that the poor swing voter dislikes the Left, while the rich one likes it). As is clear from equation (32), the intensity of this effect is proportional to the extent of redistribution, i.e. to state capacity \( \hat{\tau} \). Furthermore, the net effect of these shifts on the net propensity to vote for the Left depends on the difference between the marginal density of poor swing voters \( f(z_p) \) and the marginal density of rich voters \( f(z_R) \). This difference is positive due to our assumptions about the shape of \( f(\cdot) \) and the proportion of poor. Finally, the response of the critical \( \eta_1^* \) is larger, the smaller the average density of swing voters, \( (1 - \lambda) f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R) \). This is because the smaller this density, the greater the change in \( \eta \) which is needed at the margin to switch the balance of power by a given number of votes. Since the number of votes for the Left lost due to a higher \( \theta_1 \) is also proportional to these marginal densities, what matters for the response of \( \eta_1^* \) to \( \theta_1 \) is the relative density of swing voters \( f(z_p)/f(z_R) \), as implied by the fraction expression in (32).

Therefore we see that the increase in \( \eta_1^* \), and therefore the reduction in the Left’s probability of winning the next election, is larger, the greater the state capacity and the greater the relative density of swing voters.

How does this response of \( \eta_1^* \) to \( \theta_1 \) change when state capacity becomes larger? The answer is in the RHS of (34). First there is the direct effect of \( \hat{\tau} \), which increases the intensity of preferences for redistribution and
The first three terms in (33) are negative and they represent the appropriation effect generated by a higher feasible tax rate. These components push towards a reduction of $\theta^*_1$ as $\hat{\tau}$ increases (i.e., $\partial \theta^*_1 / \partial \hat{\tau} \leq 0$). The interpretation of these components is the following. The first term comes from the fact that the poor gain more from the Left in power when $\hat{\tau}$ is higher. Hence, the higher is $\hat{\tau}$ and the higher is the incentive for party $P$ to reduce $\theta_1$ in order to increase the probability of being elected. The second term captures the expected increase in redistribution, which takes place when the Left is in power, generated by a higher $\hat{\tau}$. This reduces the cost of a lower pre-tax income of the poor (i.e., of a lower $\theta^*_1$) so favoring entrenchment. The third term accounts for the fact that a higher $\hat{\tau}$ reduces $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$ making the Left more popular and more often in power. Again, this reduces the cost of a lower pre-tax income of the poor and favors entrenchment.

The last two terms in (33) represent the marginal political return effect generated by the increase in state capacity. The fourth term is positive and comes from the fact that the increase in $\hat{\tau}$ reduces $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$ (the Left is more popular), which in turn leads to a reduction in the mass of citizens at the margin. Hence, a lower level of $\theta_1$ would lead to a smaller increase in the votes gained by the Left. This lowers the scope for entrenchment and leads to a higher $\theta^*_1$. The final term captures the direct effect of $\hat{\tau}$ on the responsiveness of election outcomes to entrenchment, as captured by $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$, and it can be positive or negative. In sum, as the appropriation effect and the marginal political return effect may have opposite sign, the total effect of higher state capacity on the choice of $\theta^*_1$ will generally be ambiguous. Nevertheless, in some special cases, which are described in Section 5.4, the effect of state capacity on entrenchment is not ambiguous.

Therefore the magnitude with which the swing voters move to the center. This effect tends to magnify the positive response of $\eta^*_1$ to $\theta_1$ (which in itself tends to increase entrenchment). Hence the first term on the RHS of (34).

Second, $\hat{\tau}$ has a direct impact on the ideological preferences of the poor and the rich swing voters, $z_P$ and $z_R$. As more is redistributed from rich to poor whenever the Left is in power, fewer rich people, and more poor people, vote in its favor. Consequently, the poor swing voter dislikes the Left more, while the rich swing voter likes it more. The marginal density of swing voters falls for both the poor and the rich, and therefore the effect on the relative density is ambiguous. This is captured by the second term in the RHS of (34). However, if it were the case that $|f'(x)/f(x)|$ were nonincreasing with $|x|$, then we would have that $-f'(z_R)/f(z_R) \geq f'(z_P)/f(z_P)$ and this second term would be non negative.

Finally, $\hat{\tau}$ has an indirect effect on the identity of the swing voters through its effect on $\eta^*_1$. We know that $\partial \eta^*_1 / \partial \hat{\tau} < 0$, meaning that the Left wins the election more often when state capacity is larger, due to the fact that the poor are a majority. Thus, the aggregate ideological shock beyond which the Left wins the election is more unfavorable to the Left, meaning that the corresponding swing voters have an increased own taste for the Left. Therefore, $z_P$ and $z_R$ both go up. This makes the poor swing voter less extreme (i.e. disliking the Left less) and the rich swing voter more extreme (i.e. liking the Left more). This raises $f(z_P)$ and reduces $f(z_R)$. Therefore, the relative density $f(z_P)/f(z_R)$ goes up, which increases the votes lost by the Left when $\theta_1$ goes up, thus increasing $\eta^*_1(\theta_1)$. Hence the third term in the RHS of (34), which is positive.
10.5 The Effect of Income Inequality

In this appendix, we analyze the effect of income inequality on entrenchment. We rewrite

\[ a^r = \frac{\mu}{\lambda} a \quad \text{and} \quad a^p = \frac{1 - \mu}{1 - \lambda} a, \]  

with \( \mu \in (\lambda, 1) \) representing an index of income inequality and \( a \) the average income.

Using (20), we obtain that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 V_1^p(\theta_1; \mu)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \mu} = -\frac{a}{1 - \lambda} \left[ 1 - (1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))) \hat{\tau} \lambda \right] \\
- \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1) \left[ 1 + \hat{\tau} \lambda \left( \frac{a}{\lambda} + \frac{\theta_1 a}{1 - \lambda} \right) \right] + \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} \hat{\tau} \lambda a^p \\
- \phi'(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1) [\delta + \Delta^p_1(\theta_1)] - \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \frac{\partial \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} [\delta + \Delta^p_1(\theta_1)].
\]

From the implicit differentiation of (15) with respect to \( \mu \) and (35) we have that

\[
\frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} = -\hat{\tau} \lambda (1 - \lambda) \left( \frac{a}{\lambda} + \frac{\theta_1 a}{1 - \lambda} \right) \frac{f(z_p) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda)f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)} < 0,
\]

and the derivative of \( \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1) \) in (32) with respect to \( \mu \) leads to

\[
\frac{\partial \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} = -\lambda \hat{\tau} a \frac{f(z_p) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda)f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)} - \lambda(1 - \lambda) \hat{\tau}^2 a^p \left( \frac{a}{\lambda} + \frac{\theta_1 a}{1 - \lambda} \right) \left[ \frac{\lambda f(z_R)f'(z_p) - (1 - \lambda)f(z_p)f'(z_R)}{[(1 - \lambda)f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)]^2} \right] \\
- \lambda(1 - \lambda) \hat{\tau} a^p \frac{\partial \eta_1^*(\theta_1)}{\partial \mu} \frac{f(z_R)f'(z_p) - f(z_p)f'(z_R)}{[(1 - \lambda)f(z_p) + \lambda f(z_R)]^2},
\]

whose sign is generally ambiguous as the first term is negative and the other two are positive.

From (36) follows that the effect of higher income inequality on entrenchment is ambiguous and it is very similar to the effect of state capacity. In fact, the first three terms in (36) are negative and they represent the appropriation effect generated by higher inequality; these components push towards a reduction of \( \theta_1^* \) as income inequality increases (\( \partial \theta_1^*/\partial \mu \leq 0 \)). The last two terms are the marginal political return effect from higher inequality. The fourth term is positive and comes from the fact that an increase in \( \mu \) makes the Left more popular, so reducing the mass of citizens at the margin; this reduces the scope for entrenchment and leads to a higher \( \theta_1^* \) (\( \partial \theta_1^*/\partial \mu \geq 0 \)). The final term has a similar interpretation and will generally be ambiguous since this is case for \( \partial \eta_1^{**}(\theta_1)/\partial \mu \). As the appropriation effect and the marginal political return effect may have opposite sign, the total effect of income inequality on \( \theta_1^* \) will generally be ambiguous.
10.6 Proof of Lemma 5

Point 2. Note that \( \eta^*_1(\theta_1) \) is bounded from above by \( \lambda \tau a^p \); using this result, and the fact that \( \Delta^p_1(\theta_1) \) is decreasing in \( \theta_1 \) and therefore it is maximized at \( \theta_1 = \theta^L \), it is straightforward to verify that \( \partial^2 V^p_1(\theta_1; \nu)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \nu < 0 \) everywhere if Condition 1 is satisfied. Point 3. Condition 2 ensures that \( -f'(z_R)/f(z_R) \geq f'(z_P)/f(z_P) \) since \( |z_P| < |z_R| \), which implies that also the second term in equation (33) is positive, so that \( \partial^2 \eta^*_1(\theta_1)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \tau > 0 \). Condition 1 guarantees that the algebraic sum of the third and fourth terms in equation (33) is negative, again since \( \eta^*_1(\theta_1) \) is bounded from above by \( \lambda \tau a^p \) and \( \Delta^p_1(\theta_1) \) is maximized at \( \theta_1 = \theta^L \), which implies that \( \partial^2 V^p_1(\theta_1; \tau)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \tau < 0 \) everywhere.

10.7 Proof of Lemma 6

As \( \tau \downarrow 0 \), \( \eta^*_1(\theta_1) \downarrow 0 \), and \( z_P \) and \( z_R \) both tend to zero, which means that also \( [f(z_P) - f(z_R)] \) tend to zero. This in turn implies that \( \partial \eta^*_1(\theta_1)/\partial \tau \uparrow 0 \) and \( \partial^2 \eta^*_1(\theta_1)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \tau \downarrow 0 \), so that from (20) follows that

\[
\lim_{\tau \to 0} \frac{\partial^2 V^p_1(\theta_1; \tau)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \tau} = -[1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1))] \lambda a^p < 0.
\]

Therefore, if state capacity is limited, by submodularity it follows that higher state capacity weakly increases entrenchment by the Left (i.e., \( \partial^1 \eta^*_1/\partial \tau \leq 0 \)).

10.8 Proof of Lemma 7

We first show that \( \partial \eta^*_0(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L < 0 \) when state capacity is sufficiently small. From the implicit differentiation of equation (26) defining \( \eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) \) when \( \theta^*_1 = \theta^L \), we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \eta^*_0(\theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = \frac{(1 - \lambda)f(\hat{z}_P)(\partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)/\partial \theta^L) + \lambda f(\hat{z}_R)(\partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)/\partial \theta^L)}{(1 - \lambda)f(\hat{z}_P) + \lambda f(\hat{z}_R)},
\]

where \( \hat{z}_P \equiv -\Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) - \eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) \) and \( \hat{z}_R \equiv -\Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) - \eta^*_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) \). The differentiation of \( \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) \) and \( \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L) \), defined respectively in (23) and (24), with respect to \( \theta^L \) leads to

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = \beta \frac{\partial U^p_1(\theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = \beta \left\{ a^p - \left[1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta^L))\right] \tau a^p + \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta^L)) \eta^*_1(\theta^L) \Delta^p_1(\theta^L) \right\},
\]

and

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = \beta \frac{\partial U^p_1(\theta^L)}{\partial \theta^L} = \beta \left\{ \left[1 - \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta^L))\right] (1 - \lambda) \tau a^p + \Phi(\eta^*_1(\theta^L)) \eta^*_1(\theta^L) (1 - \lambda) \tau (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) \right\}.
\]

From Lemma 2 follows that \( \eta^*_1(\theta^L) > 0 \) and, therefore, that \( \partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)/\partial \theta^L \) is always positive. The sign of \( \partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)/\partial \theta^L \) is instead generally ambiguous. However, as \( \tau \downarrow 0 \), \( \eta^*_1(\theta_1) \downarrow 0 \), and \( \partial \Delta^p_0(\theta_0, \theta^L)/\partial \theta^L > 0 \), which in turn implies that \( \partial \eta^*_0(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L < 0 \).
We now show that \( \partial V_0^P(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L > 0 \) for all \( \theta^L \in [0,1] \) when \( \tau \) is small enough and \( \delta \) is relatively high.

From (19), it follows that

\[
V_1^P(\theta^L) - V_1^P(1) = \theta_1 a^p + [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^r(\theta_1))] [\delta + \Delta_1^p(\theta^L)] - a^p - [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^r(1))] [\delta + \Delta_1^p(\theta^L)],
\]

and substituting this expression and (20) into (29), we obtain that

\[
\partial V_0^P(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L = [1 - \Phi(\eta_0^r(\theta^L))] \beta \alpha^p \{1 - [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^r(\theta^L))] \tau \lambda\} - [1 - \Phi(\eta_0^r(\theta^L))] \beta \phi(\eta_1^r(\theta^L)) \eta_1^r(\theta^L) [\tau \lambda (a^r - \theta_1 a^p) + \delta]
\]

\[-\phi(\eta_0^r(\theta^L)) \partial \eta_0^r(\theta^L) \partial \theta^L \beta \{[1 - \Phi(\eta_1^r(\theta^L))] [\delta + \Delta_1^p(\theta^L)] - [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^r(1))] [\delta + \Delta_1^p(1)]\}
\]

\[-\phi(\eta_0^r(\theta^L)) \partial \eta_0^r(\theta^L) \partial \theta^L [\delta - \beta (1 - \theta_1 a^p)].\]

The first and second term of (37) are respectively positive and negative since \( \eta_1^r(\theta^L) > 0 \). \( \partial \eta_0^r(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L < 0 \) ensures that the third term is positive; in fact, from \( \theta^L < 1 \) follows that \( \Delta_1^p(\theta^L) > \Delta_1^p(1) \), and \( \eta_1^r(\theta^L) > 0 \) implies that \( \eta_1^r(\theta^L) < \eta_1^r(1) \) and that \( \Phi(\eta_1^r(\theta^L)) < \Phi(\eta_1^r(1)) \).

The fourth term has an ambiguous sign depending on the level of the rents from office; however, this term is positive when the rents are sufficiently high, i.e. \( \delta > \tilde{\delta} \equiv \beta a^p \).

As \( \tau \downarrow 0 \), \( \eta_1^r(\theta_1) \downarrow 0 \), and the second term of (37) tends to zero. If \( \delta > \delta^* \equiv \max\{\delta^*, \tilde{\delta}\} \), then \( \partial V_0^P(\theta^L)/\partial \theta^L \) is positive for all \( \theta^L \in [0,1] \).\footnote{We remind that \( \delta^* \) guarantees that \( V_1^P(\theta; \delta) \) is everywhere decreasing in \( \theta_1 \) for any \( \delta > \delta^* \) (see Remark 1) so that \( \theta_1^r = \theta^L \).}

This means that the ex-ante welfare of the Left is globally strictly increasing in \( \theta^L \) and, therefore, it is maximized at \( \theta^L = 1 \). This result completes the proof of the Lemma.

### 10.9 The Possibility of Entrenchment by the Right

We now show that also the Right might pursue entrenchment policies damaging their own constituency in order to obtain electoral gains. In particular, we now assume that the pre-tax income of each high-skill agent is

\[
a^r(\theta; \gamma) = (1 + \gamma \theta)a^r,
\]

where \( \gamma \) can be positive or negative. To make sure that the rich have a pre-tax income higher than the poor for any level of \( \theta \), we make the following assumption.

**Assumption 4** \( \gamma > (a^p/a^r) - 1 \equiv \gamma^*. \)
The aggregate and average level of income can now be written as

\[ \bar{a}(\theta; \gamma) \equiv \lambda a^r + [\lambda\gamma a^r + (1 - \lambda)a^p] \theta. \]

Note that when \( \gamma > 0 \) the income of both groups, the high-skilled and the low-skilled, is increasing in \( \theta \). Therefore, a reduction of \( \theta \) harms both groups, thus generating an inefficient outcome. Conversely, when \( \gamma < 0 \) the pre-tax income of the rich is decreasing in \( \theta \) and a reduction of \( \theta \) harms the poor and benefit the rich, but it may increase or decrease aggregate output; this case may capture those policies that damage directly the unskilled but benefit directly the skilled, such as permitting the immigration of unskilled labor, which corresponds to a reduction of \( \theta \) when \( \gamma < 0 \). The following Corollary summarizes these points.

**Corollary 2** A change in \( \theta \) has the following effects on individual and aggregate productivity.

1. If \( \gamma > 0 \), a fall in \( \theta \) harms both groups, and reduces aggregate output; hence, the socially efficient value of \( \theta \) is 1.

2. If \( \gamma < 0 \), a fall in \( \theta \) harms the poor and benefits the rich. Moreover,
   2a. if \( -(1 - \lambda)a^p/\lambda a^r < \gamma < 0 \), a fall in \( \theta \) leads to aggregate productivity losses; hence, as in the baseline model, the socially efficient value of \( \theta \) is 1;
   2b. if \( \gamma < -(1 - \lambda)a^p/\lambda a^r \), a fall in \( \theta \) leads to aggregate productivity gains; hence, the socially efficient value of \( \theta \) is \( \theta^L \).

The analysis of the equilibrium of the subgame played at time \( t = 1 \) is basically unchanged and will not be repeated in detail. In particular, since the value of \( \theta_1 \) has been already determined at this point, the only action happening in the second stage of the game is the counting of votes. Again, there will exist a threshold value \( \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \) such that the Left wins when \( \eta > \eta_1^*(\theta_1) \), and vice versa.

To understand the incentives of the two parties to manipulate strategically \( \theta_1 \) in this new environment, it is useful to look at net value of fiscal redistribution for the two income groups, which is the endogenous determinant of the period 1 voting rules (see expression (13)). The net value of the fiscal transfer obtained by the poor and the rich when the Left is in power is respectively given by

\[ \Delta_1^\ell(\theta_1; \gamma) = \tau\lambda [(1 + \gamma\theta_1)a^r - \theta_1a^p], \quad (38) \]

\[ ^{43} \text{This last range of parameters in non-empty if and only if } a^p/a^r < \lambda, \text{ which is the case when } \gamma < -(1 - \lambda)a^p/\lambda a^r. \]
and
\[ \Delta'_1(\theta_1; \gamma) = -\hat{\tau}(1 - \lambda) [(1 + \gamma \theta_1) a^r - \theta_1 a^p]. \]  
(39)

Differentiating these expressions with respect to \( \theta_1 \), we obtain that
\[ \partial \Delta^p_1(\theta_1; \gamma) / \partial \theta_1 = \hat{\tau} \lambda (\gamma a^r - a^p), \]
and
\[ \partial \Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma) / \partial \theta_1 = -\hat{\tau}(1 - \lambda)(\gamma a^r - a^p). \]

The main difference with the baseline model is that \( \Delta^p_1(\theta_1; \gamma) \) and \( \Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma) \) may now increase or decrease with \( \theta_1 \) depending on the value of \( \gamma \). As we will see, there exists now conditions under which the Right may have the incentive to entrench itself, i.e., to reduce the future income of its constituency in order to consolidate its political power. Moreover, if the political rents \( \delta \) appropriated by incumbent politicians are sufficiently high, social welfare (measured by aggregate output) will not necessarily be reduced by entrenchment policies and may in some cases even increase, in contrast to the baseline model where higher levels of \( \delta \) never raise aggregate output.\(^{44}\)

It is useful to remember that the value of \( \theta_1 \) chosen by the party in office in the first period is affected by two forces. As parties are partially benevolent, they tend to choose the value of \( \theta_1 \) that maximizes the income of their own natural constituency. However, as they are partially selfish, they also take into account the effect of \( \theta_1 \) on their probability of winning the elections in the following period. In particular, from (16) follows that the effect of \( \theta_1 \) on the probability of the Right of winning the elections at time 1 is
\[ \frac{\partial \sigma^R_1(\theta_1)}{\partial \theta_1} = \phi(\eta^*_1(\theta_1)) \eta''_1(\theta_1), \]  
(40)

which has the same sign of \( \eta''_1(\theta_1) \). By differentiating equation (15) with respect to \( \theta_1 \), we obtain that
\[ \eta''_1(\theta_1) = \lambda(1 - \lambda)\hat{\tau} (a^p - \gamma a^r) \frac{f(z_P) - f(z_R)}{(1 - \lambda)f(z_P) + \lambda f(z_R)}, \]  
(41)
where \( z_P \) and \( z_R \) are defined as in Lemma 2 and where \( \Delta^p_1(\theta_1; \gamma) \) and \( \Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma) \) in (38) and (39) replace \( \Delta^p_1(\theta_1) \) and \( \Delta^r_1(\theta_1) \). From (41) it is immediate that the sign of \( \eta''_1(\theta_1) \) is the same as of \( (a^p - \gamma a^r) \). Therefore, if \( a^p - \gamma a^r > 0 \), then \( \eta''_1(\theta_1) > 0 \), and higher levels of \( \theta_1 \) increase the probability of the Right of winning the elections at time 1, and vice versa.\(^{45}\)

\(^{44}\)We recall that, in the baseline model, higher political rents have either no effect on the choice of \( \theta_1 \), and therefore on social welfare, if the Right is in office, or they are potentially welfare-reducing when the Left is in power since they make entrenchment more valuable.

\(^{45}\)The opposite result holds for the probability of the Left (17) of winning the elections at time \( t = 1 \).
The optimal level of $\theta_1$ for the Right can be derived from the value of party $R$ at $t = 1$
\[ V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta) = (1 + \gamma \theta_1) \alpha^r + \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \delta + [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma), \]
which implies that
\[ \frac{\partial V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)}{\partial \theta_1} = \gamma \alpha^r + [1 - \Phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1))] \hat{\tau} (1 - \lambda) \alpha^p + \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^{\prime \prime}(\theta_1) [\delta - \Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma)]. \] (42)

Finally notice that the expressions in (19) and (20) to determine the optimal level of $\theta_1$ for the Left are still valid with the caveat that the net transfer is now given by (38).

10.9.1 Case 1a. $\gamma > \alpha^p/\alpha^r$

In this case, a higher level of $\theta$ also increases the income of the high-skill individuals, so increasing aggregate output. Therefore, both parties should choose $\theta_1 = 1$ to maximize the income of their own constituencies. However, from $\eta_1^{\prime \prime}(\theta_1) < 0$ (as $\alpha^p - \gamma \alpha^r < 0$) it follows that the Right can increase the probability of winning the elections at time 1 by choosing values of $\theta_1$ lower than 1. In other words, the entrenchment strategy may be optimal for the Right, while the Left will now choose the efficient level of $\theta_1 = 1$ as this also maximizes its probability of winning future elections.

In particular, as the first two components of (42) are positive, $\Delta^r_1(\theta_1; \gamma) < 0$, $\eta_1^{\prime \prime}(\theta_1) < 0$, and $\eta_1^*(\theta_1)$ is independent on $\delta$, then $\partial V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)/\partial \theta_1$ is linearly increasing in $\delta$ and positive at $\delta = 0$. This means that $V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)$ is monotonically increasing in $\theta_1$ for all $\theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1]$ if $\delta$ is lower than a certain threshold $\tilde{\delta}$. This implies that there is no entrenchment by the Right, which will choose $\theta_1 = 1$, when the rents from office are relatively low. However, there exists a level of rents, $\tilde{\delta}$, such that $\partial V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)/\partial \theta_1 < 0$ for all $\theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1]$ when $\delta \geq \tilde{\delta}$. This means that $V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)$ is monotonically decreasing in $\theta_1$ and party $R$ will choose $\theta_1^R = \theta^L$. In other words, high levels of rents may lead the Right to choose the entrenchment strategy, i.e., lower values of $\theta$ in order to increase its probability of winning future elections at the expense of its constituency. The entrenchment strategy may also be optimal for intermediate values of $\delta$. In this case, the third term in (42) is negative but not too high, and the optimal value of $\theta_1$ for party $R$ could be interior, i.e., $\theta_1^R \in (\theta^L, 1)$. Finally notice that the negative effect of $\delta$ on $\theta_1^R$ can also be shown from the fact that
\[ \frac{\partial^2 V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial \delta} = \phi(\eta_1^*(\theta_1)) \eta_1^{\prime \prime}(\theta_1) < 0, \] (43)
meaning that the objective function of the Right is submodular in $\theta_1$ and $\delta$, and therefore that $\partial \theta_1^R / \partial \delta \leq 0$. 

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10.9.2 Case 1b. $0 < \gamma < a^p/a^r$

Again, as $\gamma > 0$, higher levels of $\theta$ increase the income of the high-skill citizens and aggregate output, so that $\theta_1 = 1$ maximizes the income of both constituencies. However, as $a^p - \gamma a^r > 0$, then $\eta_1^*(\theta_1) > 0$ and the situation is similar to the baseline model when only the Left has the incentive to choose inefficient values of $\theta_1$ in order to increase its electoral advantage in the following period.

10.9.3 Case 2. $\gamma < 0$

When $\gamma$ is negative, $\theta_1 = \theta^L$ is the level that maximizes the income of the high-skill individuals. Moreover, $\gamma < 0$ implies that $a^p - \gamma a^r > 0$ and $\eta_1^*(\theta_1) > 0$, so that the probability of the Right of winning the elections at time 1, $\sigma_1^R(\theta_1)$, is increasing in $\theta_1$ (see (40)). This means that the Right may have the incentive to choose high levels of $\theta_1$, and in the limit case $\theta_1 = 1$, even though this reduces the income of the rich. The expression in (42) contains both positive and negative components. However, when the rents from office $\delta$ are sufficiently high, the third term in (42) is likely to be so high and positive that $\partial V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)/\partial \theta_1 > 0$ for all $\theta_1 \in [\theta^L, 1]$. This means that $V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)$ is monotonically increasing in $\theta_1$ and the Right will find optimal the entrenchment strategy by choosing $\theta_1^R = 1$. In this respect, it is useful to observe that $V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)$ is supermodular in $\theta_1$ and $\delta$ as from (43) follows that $\partial^2 V_1^R(\theta_1; \delta)/\partial \theta_1 \partial \delta > 0$, since $\eta_1^*(\theta_1) > 0$, and therefore that $\theta_1^R$ is nondecreasing in $\delta$ (i.e., $\partial \theta_1^R/\partial \delta \geq 0$). This is another case where Right has the incentive to entrench itself by choosing a policy that maximizes its benefits at the expense of its constituency.

As in the baseline model, $\theta_1 = 1$ is the level of $\theta$ that maximizes the income of the low-skill producers and the Left has still the incentive to choose low levels of $\theta$ as this increases its chances of winning future elections and getting office rents.

Finally notice that we can distinguish two cases when $\gamma < 0$, depending on whether a fall in $\theta_1$ raises or lower aggregate output. Hence, when $-(1 - \lambda)a^p/\lambda a^r < \gamma < 0$ (Case 2a in Corollary 2), a reduction of $\theta_1$ raises the productivity of the rich but it is socially inefficient. Therefore, a “selfish” right-wing party that cares mainly of office rents (i.e., when $\delta$ is large) may choose for electoral reasons a high level of $\theta_1$ that harms its own constituency but, nonetheless, it pursues the efficient policy. Conversely, when $\gamma < -(1 - \lambda)a^p/\lambda a^r$ (Case 2b in Corollary 2), a fall in $\theta_1$ leads to aggregate productivity gains. In this case, the entrenchment by the Right, i.e. high levels of $\theta_1$, is socially inefficient, while the entrenchment by the Left, which chooses low values of $\theta_1$ is socially efficient. In other words, we obtain the somewhat paradoxical result
that greater political rents may now be potentially welfare improving, in the sense that they induce the Left to entrench itself more and raise aggregate output. This case is particularly interesting because a reduction of $\theta_1$ corresponds to those policies that benefit the rich, increase aggregate output, but have a direct negative effect on the income of the unskilled, such as a trade liberalization in a capital-rich economy or liberal immigration policies.

The following lemma summarizes the main results of this section.

**Lemma 8** If the level of rents from office $\delta$ is sufficiently high, then party $R$ may choose the entrenchment strategy when $\gamma > a^p/a^r$ or $\gamma < 0$. In the former case, the income of the rich is maximized at $\theta_1 = 1$, the Right chooses $\theta_1^R < 1$ and entrenchment always produces aggregate productivity losses. In the latter case, the income of the rich is maximized at $\theta_1 = \theta^L$, the Right chooses $\theta_1^R > \theta^L$ and entrenchment produces aggregate productivity gains when $-(1 - \lambda) a^p/\lambda a^r < \gamma < 0$. When $\gamma < -(1 - \lambda) a^p/\lambda a^r$, the entrenchment strategy by the Left, which chooses $\theta_1^P < 1$ is socially efficient.

11 References


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