Should the death tax die? 
And should it leave an inheritance?

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Abstract

In this paper we examine the possibility of earmarking inheritance 
taxes to the financing of a transfer to the poor, aimed at reducing the 
payoff from small crime and at fostering the fulfillment of basic social 
responsibilities. A simple model of a society in which there are two types 
of agents either supplying legal labor or participating in criminal activity 
is presented. The effects of the transfer are examined with reference to 
two policy designs and to attitudes toward risk of the agents. Financing 
the transfer through inheritance taxation may be advisable as a way of 
collecting the needed revenue from agents who are likely to maintain 
strong enough incentives to good conduct.

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1 Introduction

Estate, inheritance and gift taxes are under attack. Many countries have made great strides in reducing their scope or, as in Italy, abolishing them altogether. Criticism of this type of tax are based on\(^1\):

- the large opportunity for avoidance they offer, and the resources wasted on finding and exploiting loopholes in the tax law;
- the predicted distortionary effects upon choices pertaining to work, savings, and to business and residential location;
- wide-spread concern about the oversized public sector;
- the limited revenue collected through this type of tax, which makes further reductions or cancellation only a mild adjustment for the government, yet highly visible to taxpayers.

Criticism thus hinges primarily upon efficiency considerations. The public sector is not deemed capable of utilizing revenue more efficiently than the private and specific distortions are produced by this type of tax. Abolitionists find that the aforementioned problems overwhelm classical equity considerations centered on the potential role of estate taxes in narrowing the gaps between starting points and reducing wealth and income inequality.

In this paper, we explore the possibility of reformulating the tax, addressing areas of primary concern. With reference to the problem of controlling government growth, abolition of death duties is not necessary. One approach to resolving this problem is to earmark estate, inheritance and gift tax revenue, and to increase tax exemptions for transfers to charities and cultural foundations. This approach inhibits government’s discretionary use of collected resources and favors either private choice regarding revenue allocation (through donations to meritorious institutions),

\(^1\)For a survey, see Kaplow [4].
or public choice (as opposed to government choice) concerning the earmarked expenditure. While other efficiency drawbacks of estate taxes are more difficult to correct, one can envisage a system of earmarking funds aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of the economic system, thus providing some kind of balance against remaining inefficiencies. In this paper we examine the earmarking of death duties revenue for the financing of a citizenship dividend to the poor, conditional on fulfilment of basic social responsibilities (e.g. compulsory school attendance, tax and environment law compliance, effort to earn income, avoidance of crime). Revenue would thus be devoted to the correction of the externality stemming from the “licence to commit small crimes” for those who do not receive any share of the inheritance and are so poor as to be unable to bear monetary sanctions. The basic idea is that of a “social inheritance”, which, while accepted by the heir, implies legacy duties that must be fulfilled. One possibility is to make the payment directly conditional upon the verification of compliance with the specified duties, at some critical age\(^2\).

From this point of view, the dividend should foster the individual’s full liability for monetary sanctions for misconduct even at low income levels, and help to enforce socially advantageous behavior. Within a benefit principle approach, donors and bequeathers should see the social inheritance as a way of providing their heirs with a more favorable social environment. From an efficiency point of view, inheritance conveys information about the heir, who thanks to the assets received is likely to belong to the group of people “easily punishable” through monetary sanctions and capable of bearing the burden of financing the transfer.

The social inheritance dividend is likely to give rise to some efficiency problems typical of negative income taxation in terms of income effects and disincentives to work effort. In the paper we assess the scope of these problems.

\(^{2}\text{Legal age seems a natural reference point. Very young age classes are often characterized by a higher than the mean frequency of property crimes (see e.g. [3]).}\)
A stream of literature to which this paper is closely linked is that about redistribution as a means for reducing crime. Demoguin and Schwager [2] especially have clearly and forcefully argued in favor of social transfers as a means for attaining low levels of crime without incurring prohibitive costs. Demoguin and Schwager also present suggestive evidence\(^3\) of the contrasting scenarios in the USA (where law enforcement expenditure is quite high but crime rates are as well) and Europe (where social transfers may be counted as partial but quite effective substitutes for law enforcement expenditure). While our model is partially based on the approach of Demoguin and Schwager [2], there are some significant differences: we take into account agents risk aversion and labor supply as a continuous variable, we model small crime as a negative non depletable externality (rather than as damage for the victim alone\(^4\)) and we focus on monetary sanctions rather than imprisonment.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the objective function of the prospective heirs and state separability conditions that ease further analysis; in Section 3 we describe a society made up of two agent groups and discuss the equilibrium externality level under different assumptions about labor supply. In Section 4 we discuss the earmarking of inheritance tax revenue to social transfers when agents exhibit constant absolute or constant relative risk aversion. In Section 5 we discuss the policy in comparison with available alternatives and draw some conclusions.


\(^4\)While private damages stemming e.g. from property crime may to some extent be corrected by private expenditure on protection, the unsafe environment that arises when the crime rate is high is a public bad.
2 The agent’s problem

Let us assume that each agent aims at maximizing the following weakly separable concave utility function:

\[ V(L, U(C)) \]

where \( L \) is leisure and \( C \) is consumption, which are both normal goods. Consumption is a random variable:

\[ C(h_1, h_2) = wh_1 + \psi(h_2) - cE \]  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where \( w \) is the legal work salary, \( h_1 \) is time devoted to legal work (henceforth activity 1) and \( h_2 \) time devoted to an illegal activity (activity 2); \( h_1 + h_2 + L \leq M \), where \( M \) is a global time constraint.

Activity 2 originates externalities, which are born by everyone, with the exception of a small group of agents suffering from social alienation. The negative externalities considered here originate mainly from socially disapproved conduct and small wrongdoings or crimes (pickpocketing, noisy drunkenness, irregular waste disposal etc.). As social alienation provides a kind of solidarity among those who suffer from it, we assume that the group of socially alienated agents do not suffer from these externalities. In (1) \( c \) is the unit cost of externalities for the victim; \( E \) is the total amount of externalities. Remuneration of activity 2 is:

\[ \psi(h_2) = b h_2 \text{ with probability } (1 - p); \]
\[ = -a - sh_2 \text{ with probability } p, \]
\[ \text{if } wh_1 - cE \geq a + sh_2 \text{ and } h_2 > 0; \]
\[ = -(wh_1 - cE) \text{ with probability } p, \]
\[ \text{if } wh_1 - cE < a + sh_2 \text{ and } h_2 > 0 \]
\[ = 0 \text{ with probability } p, \text{ if } h_2 = 0 \]
that is, the agent, engaging in the illegal activity receives a remuneration $b_i$, which is a money measure of the subjectively felt advantages of the activity. However, the agent loses that remuneration and bears a linear penalty if detected (with probability $p$) and provided that her income is high enough to bear the loss. If the agent has too low an income, she loses it entirely if detected\(^5\). Monetary sanctions seem to be more apt to fit the type of crime considered in the paper, while resorting to imprisonment may violate marginal deterrence\(^6\). We refer to a penalty with a fixed component as a simple modelling strategy to introduce the problem of agents “hard to punish” due to lack of resources\(^7\). Moreover, in practice, fixed components or lump-sums are quite frequent in monetary sanctions.

As the utility function considered is weakly separable, a necessary condition for maximizing the agents utility is the maximization of the subutility function $U(C)$, that must be ensured together with the optimal allocation of time to leisure and work. We shall mainly focus on the implications of this necessary condition, quoting $U(C)$ as the agent’s utility function, with a little abuse of language. We assume that $U(C)$ exhibits risk aversion.

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\(^5\) That is $w_1$ is used to partially pay for the sanction, while detection implies the loss of $b_iw_2$.

\(^6\) Often alternative sanctions (such as serving in social activities) are mandated for the types of misconduct being considered. As, however, the duties imposed can be violated in turn, further enforcement must always be available either through monetary sanctions or other forms of enforcement (imprisonment, etc.).

\(^7\) Even without this fixed penalty component, the problem of too low an income to bear the sanction could be originated e.g. by a minimum time requirement of activity 2, that implies that income received from activity 1 is not enough to pay the proportional penalty; or from a productivity level too low to find a job in activity 1 altogether.
3 The two type society

For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that there are two types of agents, characterized by either high or low productivity. They will be referred to by the index \( i = r, p \). With reference to the illegal activity, remunerations \( b_i \) within each group are uniformly distributed on the interval \([0,1]\). Highly productive agents comprise a large majority, and their number is \( N_r > 1 \). Given their salary \( w^r \) for activity 1, they are fully deterred by the current expected penalty, that is:

\[
p \geq \frac{b^r_r - w^r}{b^r_i + s}
\]

or expected sanction\(^8\) \( p (b^r_i + s) \) is equal to or greater than the additional remuneration that activity 2 secures in comparison with activity 1, for \( b^r_i \leq 1 \). This implies that, as long as they are fully liable, their preferred choice, in order to maximize \( U(C) \), is to give up any illegal activity. Moreover, agents in the high productivity group are not interested in becoming not liable by giving up legal work, as:

\[
(1 - p)U(h^r_2(b^r_i) - cE) \leq U(h^r_1(w^r)w^r - cE)
\]

where the l.h.s. refers to the expected utility of a not liable agent who specializes in activity 2 and is characterized by \( b^r_i = 1 \), while the r.h.s. refers to the certain utility of the one who specializes in activity 1. In (2) \( h^r_2(b^r_i) \) is the preferred amount of hours of work chosen by the aforementioned agent who specializes in activity 2, while \( h^r_1(w^r) \) is the preferred amount in case of specialization in activity 1. Specialization arises in case of lack of liability as, whenever \( b^r_i \geq w^r \), it ensures the largest expected utility for the agent who wants to perform activity 2 (because in case of detection

\(^8\)Only marginal sanction is relevant with reference to marginal conditions for utility maximization. \( b_i \) must be taken into account in addition to \( s \) because detected agents lose their remuneration.
she always loses everything no matter how much activity done\(^9\). In the opposite case, whenever \(w^r > b_1^r (1 - p)\), a mixed choice cannot outperform specialization in activity 1.

High productive agents thus always prefer activity 1. They are victims of the externalities, but do not produce them.

Low productive agents group is less large (we assume \(N_p = 1\)). They earn a salary \(w^p < (1 - p)\), which is lower than the highest expected remuneration of the illegal activity. Moreover, their low salary implies that they cannot bear the loss due to the penalty, as \(w^p M < a\), so that even for a very low engagement in activity 2 they cannot pay it. Hence their prospect in case of detection is the loss of the whole income.

We assume that low productive agents do not bear any cost for externalities produced by other people. We expect again that they specialize in one of the two activities, for the reasons already clarified. The low productive agent’s decision about which activity to embrace depends upon the value \(b_i\) of the subject; it is based on an inequality similar to (2). To have a clearer picture, we assume for the moment that the labor supply by this social group is inelastic and fixed at level \(h^p\) in both activities, and we specify the utility function as an exponential, characterized by constant absolute risk aversion. We solve it for \(b_i^p\) in order to determine the activity 2 remuneration level that is small enough to command the choice of activity 1\(^{10}\). We solve the following inequality:

\[
\{1 - \exp[-\alpha (h^p w^p)]\} \geq (1 - p) \{1 - \exp[-\alpha (h^p b_i^p)]\}
\]

where on the l.h.s. the utility of the agent who works legally is considered, while on

\(^9\)That is, specialization in activity 2 maximizes the value of the l.h.s. of (2), which does not imply however that the utility so reached is higher than that available from activity 1, described in the r.h.s.; inequality will hold only for specific values of the parameters.

\(^{10}\)We rely on the standard assumption that an agent who is indifferent between legal and illegal activity chooses the first.
the r.h.s. there is the expected utility of the agent engaged in the illegal activity, and $\alpha$ is the absolute risk aversion. We thus find:

$$b^p_i \leq - \left( \frac{1}{\alpha h^p} \ln \left[ \frac{-p + \exp[-\alpha (h^p w^p)]}{1 - p} \right] \right)$$ \hspace{1cm} (4)$$

with $\lim_{\alpha \to 0} b^p_i \leq \frac{w^p}{1 - p}$ (applying de L'Hopital's rule), that is the wage provided for legal work must be greater than or equal to the expected remuneration from illegal activity in case of risk neutrality, to make activity 1 the preferred one$^{11}$.

The $b^p_i$ value that equates the two sides of 4, thanks to the assumption of uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1], and by assuming that for this type of agents $N_p = 1$, also measures the number of compliers among the low productive agents. The complement to one is the number of agents who engage in the illegal activity. Hence the total amount of externality produced is $(1 - b^p_i) h^P$. Note that the number of honest agents $b^p_i$ is increasing in $w^p$.

In the more general case, the amount of hours worked in activity 2 varies as a function of $b^p_i$, while the preferred amount of hours worked in activity 1 does not depend on $b^p_i$ because of the agent’s specialization. While labor supply in activity 2 may be backward bending, as consumption is a normal good by assumption, $h_2(b^p_i) b^p_i$ must be increasing in $b^p_i$. Hence, it is still possible to find a $b^p_i$ value that separates those who choose activity 1 from those who choose activity 2. If labor supply in activity 2 is backward bending, $b^p_i$ is pushed up. The opposite effect obtains if labor supply in activity 2 constantly increases in $b^p_i$.

$^{11}$ To ensure that the right hand side in (4) is well defined we assume $p < \exp[-\alpha (h^p w^p)]$.
4 The role of the inheritance tax

Let us now consider an enlarged version of the static model so far considered. Each high productive agent has now an additional source for financing her consumption, that is an inheritance that amounts to $B > 0$ received from her mother, who in deciding about it was motivated by altruistic considerations. High productive agents may consider the possibility of introducing by majority voting an inheritance taxation in order to finance a transfer to low productive agents. The logic is that of increasing the opportunity cost of illegal behavior, in order to raise welfare, by reducing the amount of externalities.

It is assumed on the other hand that transferring the revenue collected through taxation to the low productive agents implies increasing costs, so that total costs of the policy are given by $f(g)BN \geq gBN$, where $0 \leq g \leq 1$ is the net rate of transfer and each high productive agent bears a cost of $f(g)B$. We assume also that $f(0) = 0$, $f'(0) = 1$, $f' > 0$, $f'' > 0$ and $f'(q) = \infty$, that is actual marginal taxation rate is higher than the legal one and is increasing; it becomes prohibitive at $q$, reflecting the maximum of the Laffer curve. Financing the transfer through inheritance taxation may in fact introduce distortions into the decedent’s choice about the inheritance to bequeath, alongside with avoidance activities. As long as the proposed policy, however, induces a net increase in the high productive agents utility, they should vote in favor of it. So should the low productive agents who benefit from the transfer.

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12 For simplification we refer to a one-parent one-daughter society.
13 In this static model inheritances are treated as gifts. We focus upon inheritances received. Bequests are included within each high productive agent’s consumption expenditure.
14 Within this approach a transfer paid to every citizen would increase redistribution costs without adding anything in terms of externality control. A universalistic approach (e.g. through a citizenship dividend), however, may be valuable if it implies a change in the redistribution technology which reduces costs (e.g. because eligibility need not be verified).
15 Also the number of hours of work of highly productive agents might be affected by inheritance taxation. The $f(g)$ function is meant to include also this type of distortion.
The utility function of a high productive agent when the inheritance is received and the taxation-transfer policy is implemented becomes:

\[
1 - \exp \left\{ -\alpha \left[ w^r h^r_1 (w^r) - cE(g) + [1 - f(g)] B] \right] \right\}.
\] (5)

As it has been assumed that income is a normal good, and as benefiting from the inheritance the heir must feel richer, after inheriting and after the implementation of an advantageous taxation-transfer policy, she should still be fully deterred from illegal activity.

4.1 The taxation/transfer policy with constant absolute risk-aversion

The choice problem of the poor agent is modified when she is entitled to a transfer\(^{16}\) \(gBN\), which would be lost only if she is detected performing an illegal activity. Let us also assume for the moment that the labor supply of the low productive agent in both activities is inelastic and fixed at level \(h^p\). Moreover, the transfer is not large enough to render the agent liable. By rewriting the choice problem of the agent when the transfer is provided for, we find the \(b^p_i(g)\) value, that is the new legality threshold:

\[
b^p_i(g) = \frac{-1}{\alpha h^p} \left\{ \alpha gBN + \ln \left[ \frac{-p + \exp \left[ -\alpha (h^p w^p + gBN) \right]}{1 - p} \right] \right\}.
\] (6)

It can be verified that the frequency of poor agents who choose activity 1 increases at increasing rates as \(g\) increases. Thus externalities \(E(g) = [1 - b^p_i(g)] h^p\) decrease accordingly. On the other hand, transfers also have strictly increasing marginal costs. An example in which the policy is worthwhile is illustrated in Figure 1, where \(g^{**}\) refers to the transfer level which implies that \(b^p_i(g) = 1\), so that there are never

\(^{16}\)Remember that the number of poor people has been normalized to 1.
Figure 1: The transfer is worthwhile until level $g^*$

reasons for increasing the transfer further$^{17}$.

Even when the transfer is set at a level that induces elimination of the externality, this does not always imply equalizing incomes, as the tax may take away only part of the inheritance received, and as the salary of the high productive agent may from the outset be much higher than the level needed to ensure the preference for activity 1 on the part of low productive agents.

What happens if the amount of hours worked by the poor drops in both activities as a consequence of the transfer $\text{via}$ the income effect? Even in this case there is still a unique solution to equation (3), for each given $gBN$ level, as the l.h.s. does not depend on $b_i$ while the r.h.s. is still increasing in it. Even if the labor supply is backward bending, income from activity 2, being a normal good, cannot decrease

$^{17}$The transfer could stop beforehand also if low productive agents become liable and thus fully deterred by the current sanction.
if work remuneration increases. In this case, however, the stimulating effect of the transfer on good conduct could somewhat be reduced, to the extent that the transfer received partially substitutes for earned income instead of adding to it in order to increase the preference for legal conduct. To point out the effects, we rewrite (3) as an equality which highlights the role of the transfer:

$$1 - \exp \left\{ -\alpha \left[ h_1(g, w^p)w^p + gBN \right] \right\} = (1 - p) \left\{ 1 - \exp \left[ -\alpha \left( h_2(g, b^p_i)b^p_i + gBN \right) \right] \right\}$$

Differentiation yields:

$$\frac{\delta b^p_i}{\delta g} = \frac{-(1 - p)\alpha \exp(-\alpha y_2)(h_1 b^h_i + BN) + \alpha \exp(-\alpha y_1)(w^p h_1 b^h_i + BN)}{(1 - p)\alpha \exp(-\alpha y_2) \left[ (h_2(g, b^p_i) + \frac{b^p_i \delta h_i}{\delta g}) \right]}$$

where $y_1 = h_1(g, w^p)w^p + gBN$ and $y_2 = h_2(g, b^p_i)b^p_i + gBN$. It turns out that, whenever labor supply in activity 2 is upward sloping (and hence the denominator is positive), the transfer has a positive effect on $b^p_i$ and increases compliance the more, the larger is the drop of hours in activity 2 and the lower it is in activity 1. While overall perverse effects of the policy cannot be excluded, some beneficial effect upon the amount of externalities should at any rate be caused by the reduction in the amount of hours worked by those who choose activity 2.

An alternative to the transfer design considered so far is that of linking the transfer to legal work, for example by granting a gross salary of $w^p + g^w$, where $g^w$ is a transfer so calculated as to balance the budget. A bonus on wage income has been suggested in the literature that considers poverty as a source of negative externalities. Zeckhauser [6] argues in favor of it in a model in which the representative (rich) citizen would like the poor to have a higher income and to perform additional hours of work. Wane [5] considers a modified problem of optimal taxation, in which the poverty index negatively affects social welfare, and shows that the marginal unit of earned income should be subsidized for the poor.

In our model, by suitably reformulating (6), one can show that $b^p_i (g^w)$ increases
at increasing rates in $g^w$, given a fixed total time of work $h^p$. The targeted transfer raises the relative price of crime; it performs a kind of Pigouvian externality correction, and thus conforms to efficiency goals.

On the other hand, a subsidy that raises $w^p$ is likely to modify the chosen $h^p_1$. As, however, income from activity 1 increases (more if the substitution effect dominates, and less if the income effect dominates), while income from activity 2 stays the same, the consequences upon compliance are always beneficial\textsuperscript{18}.

### 4.2 The taxation/transfer policy with constant relative risk aversion

The effects of the transfers so far considered are to a large extent driven by the characteristics of the CARA utility function, which implies increasing relative risk aversion. The richer the socially alienated agent becomes, the higher her relative risk aversion and the larger the benefits in terms of preference for activity 1.

What about the effects in case of a CRRA utility function? In this case, when an inelastic labor supply is assumed, the poor prefers activity 1 whenever:

$$\frac{(h^p w^p)^{1-\beta}}{1-\beta} \geq (1-p) \frac{(h^p h^p)^{1-\beta}}{1-\beta}$$

where $\beta$ is relative risk aversion. By introducing an unconditional income transfer $gBN$ and solving for $h^p_1$, we calculate the frequency of complying agents:

$$h^p_1 = \left( \frac{w^p h^p + gBN}{h^p} \right) (1-p) - gBN$$

\textsuperscript{18}Zeckhauser [6] considers a linear taxation that, besides the subsidy aimed at increasing income from work, includes a fixed tax that controls for the income effect. This approach however implies that, if the poor does not work, her after tax income becomes negative. An implication which is, however, at odds with the limited liability approach followed in this paper.
To find out the effect of the transfer, we derive $b^p_i(g)$ with respect to $g$:

$$
\frac{\delta b^p_i}{\delta g} = BN \left( (1 - p)^{-1} - 1 \right)
$$

The sign of the derivative depends upon the value of relative risk aversion $\beta$. If it is greater than 1 the sign is negative; if it is lower it is positive. Thus for a high enough relative risk aversion level, raising the income of the poor agent does not result in lower externality production, as the agent’s absolute risk aversion decreases and she is more likely to choose activity 2. On the other hand this negative effect could be somewhat reduced if we allow for modifications of the time of work as a consequence of the income effect, as the number of hours worked by those who choose activity 2 may decrease.

A more suitable approach seems that of designing the transfer as a fixed increment $g^w$ over salary $w^p$. For a fixed labor supply, the frequency of complying agents becomes:

$$
b^p_i(g^w) = \frac{w^p + g^w}{(1 - p)^{-1}}
$$

In this case the number of complying agents increases linearly in $g^w$ and we have a well behaved problem of maximization of the high productive agent’s utility (5). The transfer should be increased until marginal benefit in terms of externality reduction equals marginal cost:

$$
c \frac{1}{(1 - p)^{-1}} = f'(g)BN
$$

Even if the number of hours of work is modified in activity 1 as a consequence of the transfer, the direction of the effect is at any rate towards increasing the frequency of compliers, as noted in the case of a CARA utility function.
5 Policy assessment

Even if our exemplification of possible utility functions is far from exhaustive, the case for transfers aimed at specifically improving the reward to good conduct seems strong. In this paper we thus restate the result of Demoguin and Schwager [2] in favor of functional or Pareto-efficient income redistribution organized by the state, with an important qualification. If the agent’s risk aversion is taken into account, pure income transfers can be counterproductive, to the extent that their main effect is that of reducing risk aversion. However redistributive policies to foster good conduct may still have a role if they introduce suitable incentives. While our model is structured with reference to the choice of either legal or illegal work, obviously transfers may reward the choice of any socially valuable conduct.

While the model is static and does not allow for any distinction between income and wealth, it seems natural to consider a redistribution policy financed through inheritance taxation as a redistribution of wealth. One way of implementing the transfer part of the policy could be, for example, the “Child trust fund” financed by the government under the name of newly born children, as recently designed in the United Kingdom.

Inheritance taxation earmarked to finance the transfer may be beneficial, provided that costs borne to raise and redistribute its revenue are not too high. While tax base elasticity to the tax rates is difficult to assess (as in case of income or consumption taxation), one can note that some of the observed costs due to avoidance activities derive from the “closure” nature of the death taxes with reference to other forms of income and wealth taxation, so that cancelling them would mainly transfer these costs toward avoiding other taxes. Moreover, distortions upon the decedent are excluded by definition when the inheritance occurs by chance, without any plan on the part of the bequeather.
What about resorting to other possible sources to finance the transfer aimed at reducing small crime, as an alternative to the policy examined in this paper? The most suitable alternative is an income or a consumption tax\textsuperscript{19}: e.g., one could resort to a negative income tax, to collect revenue from highly productive agents and (hopefully\textsuperscript{20}) from criminals, and to support honest low productive agents. The income differentials among these three groups however need not be large, and introducing the correct amount of progressivity may prove difficult. If there is a risk of introducing perverse incentives, resorting to inheritance taxation may be a way of exploiting the information that inheritance conveys. Within the model, by assumption, inheritance is received only by highly productive agents who are benefited by the policy considered. In the real world, assets inherited enhance the heir’s financial liability, thus signalling\textsuperscript{21} that she is likely to belong to the group of agents easy to deter. If inheritance taxation provides for suitable exemption levels, it can also avoid diluting the heir’s incentives for good conduct. Moreover, heirs often receive from their parents also contributions to human capital formation, which are ignored by wealth taxes, but which in fact contribute to enhance the heir’s potential income and liability for misconduct. Inheritance is thus likely to be a valuable signal also from this point of view.

While inheritance taxation is thus worth considering for the financing of transfers, one must also take into account that the proceeds of the death taxes in many countries are small and difficult to increase. Hence it seems likely that the transfer policy under consideration can only partially be financed this way and additional

\textsuperscript{19}Within the static model considered in the paper, they would have the same base. As we have assumed a weakly separable utility function, optimal taxation principles suggest that a well designed income tax need not be supplemented by taxation on goods (e.g. on bequests). See also Kaplow [4].

\textsuperscript{20}Remuneration \( b_t \) of illegal activity only represents a subjective monetary equivalent of activity benefits, and it may be difficult to correctly assess it as a tax base.

\textsuperscript{21}For the signalling role of inheritances, in a different context, see Cremer and Pestieau [1].
revenue sources would be needed.

An alternative to any taxation/transfer policy is represented by an increase in the probability of detection to reduce misconduct. In fact, in the model considered there is an upper constraint on the penalty (which cannot exceed income). While a penalty increase is ruled out, raising the probability of detection reduces the benefits of those who engage in activity 2, thereby providing a substitute for transfers in order to reduce externalities. Increasing the probability of detection, however, may be quite problematic. On the one hand, only if this probability is set at 1 can the externality be eradicated. Otherwise, a small expected benefit still remains available for non liable agents, which implies that someone will choose activity 2. The second problem is linked to the costs of increasing the detection probability. Costs are likely to be sharply increasing and to become prohibitive when the desired probability approaches 1. Hence some transfers are likely to provide a less costly approach, at least when the desired externality reduction is large and the opportunity for increasing the probability of detection at low costs has been exploited. Last but not least, very high detection probabilities for small crimes or unpleasant social conduct are likely to be incompatible with a liberal society, which aims at guaranteeing the privacy of choices and ways of life.

References


