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POLIS Working Papers - Working paper n. 227

Strategic delegation under the subsidiarity principle

November 2015


Abstract

This paper presents a model of centralisation, where the decision to centralise policy making is based on the subsidiarity principle. It shows how and when strategic delegation incentives facilitate the misallocation of public goods. We argue that less subsidiarity is desirable when decentralised governments use the subsidiarity principle to force distorted policies.

JEL Classification numbers

D78, H0, H41.

Keywords

centralisation; intergovernmental relations; bargaining.

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Monthly online jounal "POLIS Working Papers" - Registration n.591, 12/05/2006 - Tribunale di Alessandria
ISSN: 2038-7296


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